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Abstract
Over the course of  the late 19th to 20th centuries, the property environment in seeds has been radically  
transformed.  The  extension  of  intellectual  property  (IP)  rights  over  plant  varieties,  a  feature  of  
international law since the 1960s, represents a major shift in the status of  the seed as a resource, and has 
considerable consequences for agriculture, trade, and the livelihoods of  agricultural producers around the  
globe.  The  spread  of  intellectual  property  protections  over  seeds  has  displaced  another,  much  older  
management system, that of  the commons. Understanding how this considerable proprietary shift occurred  
involves  examining  the  way  that  various  theories  of  property  have  been  used  and  misused  in  their  
application to seeds. It reveals  that far from being an inevitable development,  the extension of  private  
property to seeds has required a significant stretching of  the tenets that underpin private property as an  
institution. This thesis analyses the development of  IP protections in seeds over the 20th century from the  
perspective of  property theory, and argues for a more balanced picture of  seed ownership as two competing  
systems – one common, one private – that have shaped each other over the course of  the century. The final  
chapter examines strategies that have been proposed to overcome the tensions between private and common 
ownership. These include rights reservation strategies, the deference to national sovereignty and open source  
biotechnology. Each of  these strategies represents an attempt to redress the negative impacts of  private  
property in seeds by engaging with the institution of  property in new ways. 
* * *
Im Laufe  des  späten  19.  und  beginnenden  20.  Jahrhunderts  fand  eine  radikale  Transformation  der  
Eigentumsverhältnisse  an  Saatgut  statt.  Die  Erweiterung  von  geistigen  Eigentumsrechten  (IP)  an 
Pflanzensorten, eine Einrichtung des internationalen Rechts seit den 1960er Jahren, brachte einen großen  
Wandel des Status von Saatgut als Rohstoff  mit sich, der erhebliche Konsequenzen für die Landwirtschaft,  
den Handel,  und das  Leben  von  Agrarproduzenten auf  der  ganzen Welt  hat.  Die  Ausweitung  des  
Schutzes  von  geistigem  Eigentum an Saatgut  hat  ein  anderes,  viel  älteres  Managementsystem  – das  
Gemeinwirtschaftliche – ersetzt. Um zu verstehen, wie sich diese erhebliche Verschiebung vollzogen hat,  
muss geprüft werden, wie verschiedene Eigentumstheorien in ihrer Anwendung auf  Saatgut genutzt und  
missbraucht wurden. Es zeigt sich, dass es sich keineswegs eine unvermeidliche Entwicklung handelt und 
dass die Anwendung des Privateigentums auf  Saatgut eine bemerkenswerte Dehnung jener Grundsätze  
erforderte, auf  welchen das Privateigentum als Institution ruht. Diese Arbeit analysiert die Entwicklung  
des  Schutzes  geistigen  Eigentums  an  Saatgut  im  20.  Jahrhunderts  aus  der  Perspektive  der  
Eigentumstheorie  und  tritt  für  ein  ausgewogeneres  Bild  von  Saatguteigentum  zwischen  zwei  
konkurrierenden Systemen – dem gemeinwirtschaftlichen und dem privatwirtschaftlichen – ein, die einander  
im Laufe des Jahrhunderts geformt haben. Das abschließende Kapitel untersucht jene Strategien, welche zur  
Überwindung der Spannungen zwischen privatem und gemeinschaftlichem Eigentum vorgeschlagen worden  
sind.  Dies  inkludiert  Strategien  des  Eigentumsvorbehalts,  die  Respektierung  nationalstaatlicher  
Souveränität und Open Source Biotechnologie. Jede einzelne dieser Strategien repräsentiert einen Versuch,  
die  negativen  Auswirkungen  des  Privateigentums  an  Saatgut  zu  beseitigen,  indem die  Institution  des  
Eigentums in neuer Art aufgegriffen wird.
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1.1 Introduction
For millennia, farmers have traded, selected and conditioned the seeds they use, selecting plants 
with desirable traits for replanting, and in doing so have fashioned the one hundred and fifty plant 
species from which we draw our sustenance.1 Plant breeding, the “deliberate identification and selection 
by a human agent of  specific qualities or traits in an organism,”2 has a history as long as agriculture 
itself. So-called traditional methods of  plant breeding, which emerged at different times in different 
parts of  the world, are the means through which the world's most important crops were domesticated.3 
Traditional plant breeding is, however, constrained by the rules of  nature. For most of  agrarian history 
farmers, as breeders, could only work within the confines of  sexual compatibility of  plant varieties, and 
could not predict  with any certainty  the outcomes of  their  selection. Since the late  19th century,  a 
number of  scientific techniques have broken down these barriers, providing breeders with a new, more 
precise set of  tools for engineering seeds. As the sophistication of  biotechnology, or techniques that 
use living organisms to modify products, plants or animals,4 has grown, so too has the ability of  plant 
breeders to target and enhance specific traits in seeds, and thereby dramatically improve their yields. 
Scientific developments in seed breeding have, since the mid 20th century, been consolidated 
and protected by laws of  intellectual property.  The extension of  IPR to varieties of  plants recognises 
the effort and scientific endeavour that goes into developing a new variety of  plant and the entitlement 
of  breeders to receive benefit from their labours. Just as advances in the science of  plant breeding have 
been concentrated in certain areas,  so too have intellectual property laws developed unevenly, with 
more  stringent  regulation  in  those  areas  of  higher  research  concentration  –  typically  agriculturally 
dominant industrialised nations of  the global North. Most industrialised countries now extend some 
form of  legal protection to scientific breeders, whether it is plant breeders' rights or patent protection. 
The result of  uneven protections is that an extremely lucrative variety of  seed in one part of  the world 
1 H. Garrison Wilkes, “Plant Genetic Resources over Ten Thousand Years: From a Handful of  Seed to the Crop-Specific 
Mega-Genebanks” in Seeds and Sovereignty: The Use and Control of  Plant Genetic Resources,  ed. Jack Kloppenburg (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988), 26.
2 Denis J. Murphy, People, Plants and Genes: The Story of  Crops and Humanity. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 234.
3 Murphy,  People, Plants and Genes, 56.
4 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: A Twentieth Century History. (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003), 135.
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may be unable to be capitalised upon in another. A push to harmonise intellectual property regimes in 
the  last  two decades,  specifically  through the 1994 Trade Related Impacts  of  Intellectual  Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, is an indication of  the expansion of  the privatisation of  the seed. 
The extension of  private property protections to seeds, to their composite genes and to the 
processes  of  manipulating  their  traits  is  a  marked shift  in  their  ownership  and management,  with 
significant  consequences  for  the  seed  and  for  the  billions  of  people  who  depend  on  it.  It  is  a 
considerable distortion of  many of  the principles that underpin private property theory and intellectual 
property  regulation.  Not  only  has it  converted a  resource  that  throughout  history  was shared and 
swapped without  remuneration into  a  commodity,  it  has  channelled the  profits  deriving  from this 
commodification to an extremely narrow base of  beneficiaries. Disputes have occurred regarding the 
unbalanced  way  in  which  the  benefits  of  genetic  advancements  have  been  distributed,  and  the 
appropriateness of  applying private rights to such an important resource has been questioned.  
Most  of  these  conflicts  centre  around  the  meaning  and  application  of  the  concept  of  
ownership. The absence of  a clear definition of  what it means to own genetic resources, the sudden 
emergence of  property protections which appear counter to the nature of  the seed, and a lack of  
congruity  between legal  regulations  of  various  countries  create  significant  conflicts  of  entitlement 
between  corporate  actors,  states,  non-government  organisations  and  farmers.  The  conflicts  of  
entitlement have escalated, and become truly global since the so-called “seed wars” at the UN's Food 
and  Agriculture  Organisation  in  the  1980s.  The  debates  are  intensified  due  to  the  nature  of  the 
distribution of  the world's genetic resources. Battlelines of  the conflict over plant genetic resources are 
often framed as the clash between the “gene-rich, grain-poor” nations of  the South, and the “gene-
poor, grain-rich” so-called breadbasket economies of  the North.5 
The conflict over seeds is less a geopolitical struggle between North and South, and more of  a 
struggle divergent views about the optimal way to manage the resource. When debates occur over the 
ownership of  seed, they concern not only who should be the owners of  seeds, but how they should own 
5    Pat Roy Mooney, “The Law of  the Seed”, Development Dialogue 1-2 (1983): 11. 
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them. The absence of  a clear system of  rules prior to private property in seeds has perpetuated the 
belief  that private propertisation appeared in a vacuum, seizing upon a resource that was unprofitable 
and  disorganised.  This  is  a  view  that  overlooks  the  centuries  of  agricultural  history  in  which 
communities of  farmers effectively managed their resources communally. The concept of  common 
property as an effective system of  management has been largely discounted by critics who associate it 
with ineffectiveness and overexploitation of  resources.6 
Far from being an ineffective system of  management, the commons need to be reframed as a 
viable alternative to private capitalist property paradigms based on individual rights of  entitlement.  The 
property environment in seeds can best be seen as two systems - one common and one private - that 
have  mutually  shaped  each  other  through  resistance  and cooperation  over  the  course  of  the  20th 
century. As a renewable, self-regenerating and replicable resource, the seed is a favourable commodity 
for management in common. Management in common was, for centuries, the dominant way in which 
seeds were held.  For a large number of  farmers, who either by choice or by circumstance, are excluded 
from the market of  propertised seed, common property management of  seeds is still a reality. 
The recognition of  the existence of  common property management in seeds has suffered from 
confusion of  terminology. The term commons is used to refer to both contained management systems 
characterised by communal entitlement to resources and a more global pool of  resources which are 
managed by humankind jointly to ensure their preservation. Perversely, the common heritage principle 
espoused by the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) was used to reinforce 
the private property system by allowing the removal of  genetic resources from gene-rich areas without 
compensation. Despite these definitional limitations,  the recognition of  common management as a 
viable and competing system of  ownership is an important step towards addressing the unbalanced 
picture of  seed ownership. 
The private property system of  IPRs in seeds has become so entrenched, its products so widely 
used and its  principles  so resolutely  affirmed in international  law that  a  return solely  to common 
6    Garrett Hardin,"The Tragedy of  the Commons," Science 162 (1968).
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management seems untenable.  There are three distinct strategies that have been pursued to redress the 
imbalances  between  private  and  common  property  management  in  seeds.  The  first  is  a  rights-
reservation strategy, which aims to carve out pockets of  rights, or compensation, for farmers within the 
private  property  system.  The  lobbying  for  farmers'  rights  is  one  such  strategy.  The  second  is  a 
deference to state sovereignty over natural resources, a principle affirmed in the Convention on Biological  
Diversity  (CBD).  By  placing  control  of  resources  in  state  hands,  it  is  hoped  that  more  equitable 
arrangements for resource transfer can be achieved. The third is an attempt to drastically resculpture 
the property landscape, responses such as open source biotechnology. None of  these strategies has 
wholly succeeded in resolving the tensions between common and private ownership.  
Recontextualising  the  expansion  of  private  property  rights  over  seeds  and  reframing  the 
commons as a viable system of  resource management illustrate that the expansion of  private property 
is not simply a displacement of  owners, but a displacement of  ownership. Solutions that focus on the 
first half  of  this issue and ignore the second cannot hope to redress the inequalities that have emerged. 
Rights  reservation  strategies  can  provide  some  relief  to  farmers,  but  a  solution  that  provides 
compensation  or  reservation  can  never  be  a  long  term,  satisfying  solution  for  producers  whose 
livelihoods have been undermined. Only open source biotechnology has provided a systemic solution, a 
new form of  property that relies on the same open and accommodating culture upon which common 
property  is  based,  while  still  encouraging  the  innovation  in  seeds  upon  which  our  burgeoning 
population has become dependent.
1.2 Approach
The approach of  this thesis is to evaluate the seed from the perspective of  the institution of  
property. It seeks to explain how a resource that was managed for millennia in common has become a 
subject of  private property protections, and how those protections have radically altered the resource 
itself, creating complex institutional structures around it. The first step is to examine the theory of  
property, ad how property theory, has, until recent times, put undue emphasis on the institution of  
private property.  Using recent environmental  scholarship that repositions the commons as  a viable 
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system of  resource management, the paper argues that the commons in seeds have been and are a 
functioning  and  efficient  system.  The  third  chapter  then  applies  theories  of  property  to  the 
contemporary and historical environment of  seeds, explaining how the tenets of  common property 
ownership have been distorted so as to support the private property system rather than undermine it. At 
the end of  the 20th century, private property has come to dominate the property landscape in seed, a 
development which threatens the situation of  farmers, particularly in the developing world, to remain 
autonomous producers. In the final chapter, three solutions that have been proposed to overcome the 
negative impacts of  private property controls will be evaluated. It will be argued that only open source 
biotechnology creates a solution which engages with the property dimensions of  the problem, but as 
the most comprehensive solution, it is also the most difficult to achieve. A more balanced approach to 
the history and current situation of  seed ownership illustrates the fact that there are large sections of  
the world that the private property regime has failed to reach, and that private property in seeds is 
unstable, illogical, and requires constant fortification. It is hoped that through such analysis a more 
balanced image of  seed ownership and management can be created, one that does not see private 
propertisation as inevitable. 
2.  History and Context of  Seed Ownership and Management
2.1 Concepts
For the purpose of  this study, the seed refers to cereal crops of  importance to human nutrition, 
the so-called plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA). It does not refer to the seeds 
of  ornamental plants or non-edible crops. Though the rose is the world's most patented plant, rights of  
ownership over it do not affect the livelihood of  producers in the developing world, nor food security. 
As Halewood and Nnadozie note,
PGRFA differ from other plant genetic resources … because human intervention has played a critical role 
in the domestication of  crops and in the human, gene and environmental interactions that have led, over 
thousands of  years, to the genetic diversity within and across species.7 
7 Michael Halewood and Kent Nnadozie, “Giving Priority to the Commons: The International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture” in  The Future  Control  of  Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and Rules of  
Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security, ed. Geoff  Tansey and Tamsin Rajotte (London: Earthscan, 2008), 117-8. 
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This study examines the impact of  proprietary rights over genetically enhanced varieties of  seeds, but 
any examination of  the merits or dangers of  genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is beyond the 
scope of  this paper.
There is no identifiable transnational group of  individuals who can be uniformly identified as 
'farmers' and many international documents refrain from defining the group specifically. New methods 
of  food production and new regulations transform the roles of  actors within the global food system, as 
Borowiak notes, “farmers have been reconfigured as consumers, competitors, and potential biopirates 
of  new commercial seed technologies.”8 When this study refers to the possibility for 'farmers' to retain 
sovereignty over their seeds, it refers primarily to small-holder producers involved in the production of  
staple crops.  Agricultural  production has been dramatically  altered in leading agricultural  producers 
such as the United States, Canada, Australia and states of  Western Europe. These countries are the 
biggest consumers of  propertised seed and agrochemical tie-in products. Farmers of  the developing 
world, whose production methods still stand to be transformed by the spread of  propertised seed, are 
therefore more of  a focus of  this paper. Clearly, while there are some agricultural producers who have 
made enormous gains in the restructuring of  benefit from the changes in agricultural production to 
mechanised, large-scale operations, there are many more who stand to lose. 
It is often said that the conflict over ownership is one of  North versus South. The terms global 
North  and global  South,  though imperfect  descriptors,  are  the  ones  relied  upon in  this  paper  to 
describe the international socio-political divide in the debate over plant genetic resources. These terms 
are relied upon extensively in seed sovereignty debates, and though reference to North and South may 
oversimplify genetic resource ownership it helps to lay the foundations for the debate. In contrast to 
agricultural  nations  of  the  global  North,  nations  of  the  South  have  little  opportunity  to  control 
international agricultural trade, have lower standards of  IP protection, lower GDPs, and have a reliance 
on crops that are lower on the research agendas of  corporate plant biotechnology actors.9 Given that 
8 Craig Borowiak, “Farmers’ Rights:  Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds”, Politics  and Society 32 
(2004): 522.
9 W. Falcon and Cary Fowler, “Carving up the Commons – Emergence of  a New International Regime for Germplasm 
Development and Transfer”, Food Policy 27 (2002): 206. 
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there are as many horizontal germplasm transfers as vertical, this paper emphasises differences in views 
of  resource management over the geographic location of  disputing parties.
2.2 The Seed
The seed can be viewed and valued in a number of  different ways.  It is, on one hand, a part of  
nature, a part of  man's common heritage, a means to ensure food security, a vital part of  life. On the 
other hand it is an extremely valuable commodity, the centre of  an enormous and profitable industry, a 
means  of  creating  and  perpetuating  economic  dependencies,  a  tool  of  leverage  in  international 
negotiation, and somewhat perversely, something that can be gifted to those in need. In the struggle of  
sovereignty  over  the  seed,  these  qualities  often  conflict.  The  seed  is  one  of  the  most  regulated 
commodities in the world.10 It is subject to both international and national regulation in the form of  
intellectual  property,  of  biosafety  rules  and  of  certification.  It  has  attracted  the  attention  of  
international organisations that traditionally have little to do with biological materials,  including the 
WTO and the OECD. Sorting through this regulatory web is a challenge for corporate actors,  for 
public breeders and for farmers alike. 
As Mooney notes, as an industrial object, the seed is both the means of  production and the 
product, making it a unique commodity.11 In order for the seed to be owned, it needs to be removed 
from its natural state, and imbued with characteristics of  value beyond what can be generated naturally. 
To create a product with market value, its ability to replicate needs to be suppressed, and its ability to 
yield enhanced. The seeds of  the Green Revolution, and later of  the biotechnology revolution, have 
these qualities, and are fundamentally different from the landraces upon which they have been built. 
They are designed for large scale  production and encourage the pursuit  of  commercially  intensive 
farming and uniformity.12 As Shiva argues, this type of  seed is new because it possesses neither the 
ability to produce itself  nor reproduce itself.13  It is perfectly able to be bought, sold, owned and traded, 
10 Bernard  Le  Buanec  and  Patrick  Heffer,  “The  Role  of  International  Seed  Associations  in  International  Policy 
Development”, Journal of  New Seeds 4, no.1 (2002): 78.
11 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 16.
12 Marc Lappe and Britt Bailey, Against the Grain: The Genetic Transformation of  Global Agriculture. (London: Earthscan, 1999), 
98-99. 
13 Vandana Shiva, Monocultures of  the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology. (London: Zed Books, 1993), 145.
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as any other commodity, and not as a removable, replicable, self-generating part of  nature. 
The commoditised seed is one that is  tailored to generate profit, and is therefore produced 
according to a different set of  priorities. In traditional breeding, variance was a desirable trait in plant 
species. Genetic diversity formed a sort of  insurance for farmers that at least some of  their crop would 
come to maturity.14 In scientific breeding, and in the commoditised seed, uniformity and yield are the 
desirable traits. Other traits are less significant, and as a result are often eliminated. This type of  seed is 
the product of  a certain type of  knowledge, research conducted by individuals inside the confines of  a 
scientific profession. Any development that occurs outside of  these confines, within communities, on a 
collective basis, is not valued, and thus not rewarded, in the same way.  
In the 20th Century, mechanisation, large scale farming and chemical inputs altered the face of  
agricultural practice in many parts of  the world, perhaps irrevocably. The seed is the centre of  this 
transformation. According to Kenney, “the seed will become the proprietary nexus for plant genetic 
engineering.  The seed is  a  vehicle  for conveying the fruits  of  molecular  biological  research to the 
farmer and thereby realising a profit on the incorporated research.”15 In the middle of  a system based 
on chemical inputs, artificial fertilisers, mechanised production and the elevation of  capital over labour 
is the new seed that is tailored to a specific method of  production. Key to addressing the issues of  
food sovereignty, food production and sustainability is a critical and balanced approach to ownership of  
the seed, which recognises that is it  both shaped by and influential upon a transformed system of  
agricultural production. 
2.3 History of  Seed Ownership
Throughout the history of  agriculture, humankind has had a specific relationship with the crops 
harvested,  learning  the  correct  environments  for  particular  seeds  and  tailoring  their  attributes  to 
production needs through selection. Agricultural improvement was a relatively slow process, in most 
areas of  the world characterised by small-scale, extensive rather than intensive farming.16 Agricultural 
14 Jack Kloppenburg and Daniel Kleinman, “Seeds of  Struggle: Genetic Resources and Geopolitics”, Technology Review 90 
(February/March 1987): 48.
15 Kenney quoted in Dutfield, Intellectual Property Laws, 149.
16 Murphy, People, Plants and Genes, 94. 
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crops have become as much dependent on this process of  selection and harvesting for survival as 
humans. As crops have developed, this interdependence has grown; now a modern corn variety cannot 
dispense its seed without the help of  a human agent.17  
One of  the striking features of  world agriculture is  the extreme crop interdependence that 
characterises the entire globe. No one area of  the world secures its population's sustenance from purely 
local crops. The 'discovery' of  the Americas and the Columbian Exchange were the first major steps in 
creating this interdependence, and were instrumental in the transfers of  plant genetic materials across 
and between continents. The world's most important crops moved from continent to continent, slowly 
but dramatically improving the ability of  states to produce food for growing populations. The 16th 
century  saw  the  rise  of  imperial-based  plant  collection,  as  well  as  the  birth  of  a  more  scientific 
approach  to  agriculture.  Expeditions  in  search  of  exotic  crops  created  a  flow  of  plant  resources 
between New and Old Worlds, and became linked to colonial enterprise. As Mooney writes - “like 
living pawns in the imperial chess game, coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber, bananas, sugarcane, cotton and 
spices were shifted back and forth over the surfaces of  the globe.”18
The botanic garden was an important institution facilitating the transfer of  genetic materials. 
The first collections were established by the Dutch through the Dutch East India Company in the 
1600s. The British, emulating the efforts of  the Dutch, set up the Kew Botanical Gardens in 1759, 
which became the base for collecting and dispersing crops to and from the colonies.19 These gardens 
were strategically important for the structures of  international agriculture they created. As Juma notes 
“[a] single coffee tree which reached the Amsterdam Botanical Gardens in 1706 was later the basis for 
most of  the coffee grown in South America.”20 Ethical opposition to the practice of  collecting and 
dispersing plant samples took longer to develop. According to Brockway, at the time, these collections 
were generally thought to be in the interest of  humanity, and no concept of  loss to the country of  
17 Jack Doyle, Altered Harvest: Agriculture, Genetics, and the Fate of  the World's Food Supply. (New York: Viking, 1985), 177.
18 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 85.
19 Lucile Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of  the British Royal Botanic Gardens. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press), 2002. 
20 Calestous Juma, The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds. (London: Zed Books, 1989), 43.
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origin was seriously considered.21
Plant resources from the gardens provided the foundation for plant variety research in Europe. 
Several countries developed strong public sector breeding programs, normally supported by university 
research. Colonial powers devoted research to developing their own crops as well as tropical agriculture 
to contribute to their colonies.22 Private breeding was a prominent part of  colonial strategy and remains 
a strong pursuit in many Western European nations including France, Germany and Sweden.  
In the United States, patterns of  agricultural development and plant breeding were less well-
established than in Europe, and the push for agricultural innovation was correspondingly stronger.23 In 
the early 1800s, US administrators were also establishing missions to collect new genetic materials. In 
1819 requests were sent from the Department of  the Treasury to the navy, requesting that seeds be 
collected on missions abroad.24 These collection expeditions, coupled with an open breeding strategy 
of  the government led to the proliferation of  new varieties across the continent. The strategy included 
the distribution of  seed packages from government to farmers - in 1897 alone the US government 
distributed 1.1 billion seed packets for planting.25  
The  rediscovery  of  the  work  of  Gregor  Mendel  was  a  major  breakthrough  in  scientific 
breeding, and provided the basis for the selection of  traits based on genetics. Mendel's first law was 
originally published in 1866 but was only rediscovered at the turn of  the century. Mendel described 
patterns of  dominant and recessive genes in peas, principles which generated a clear vision for breeders 
as to how to improve crops. Mendel's laws allowed breeders to develop varieties that bred true to their 
parents, thus securing their traits in resulting plants.26 Before this, any experimentation with scientific 
plant breeding had failed to guarantee the replication of  traits that would allow breeders certainty of  
results.  
21 Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion, 35. 
22 Graeme Dutfield,  “Turning Plant Varieties into Intellectual  Property” in  The Future  Control  of  Food, ed. Tansey and 
Rajotte, 31. 
23 Dutfield in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 29. 
24 Robert Evenson, “The Scientific Origins of  the Green and Gene Revolutions” in  Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade  
(Frontiers of  Economics and Globalization), ed. Keith Maskus, (Oxford: Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 2008), 470. 
25 Jack Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of  Plant Biotechnology 1492-2000. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 65.
26 Dutfield in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 29.
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By the turn of  the 20th century in the United States, through the application of  Mendel's laws, 
breeders were beginning to have successes with corn. Hybridisation, a method of  crossing two parent 
plants to reproduce the traits of  both within the progeny, was creating an increase in yields. By 1920, 
Edward East and George Shull had developed a method called heterosis, by which a corn plant is first 
inbred and then crossed.27 The use of  this method, according to Kloppenburg, was “the first time in 
history that a seedsman was enabled to gain the full benefit from a desirable origination of  his own.”28 
The product of  the cross, while producing elevated yields over open-pollinated varieties,  could not 
breed true and lost the quality of  increased yield within one generation. A farmer who wished to use 
hybrid seed had therefore to return to the market every season to purchase it. This discovery was the 
first in a long line of  innovations that increasingly disconnected farmers from their input, creating a 
market for a product that farmers could not create themselves.29 This development laid the foundations 
for the establishment of  an industry for seed.
In the mid 1930s, the impacts of  these new breeding methods were visible through dramatically 
improved corn yields and an ever growing private industry presence in the trading of  seed. Companies 
began to take notice, most notably Pioneer Hi-Bred and DeKalb Agricultural Association, who became 
involved in the development of  corn in the mid 1920s.30 At first, private breeding and public breeding 
initiatives coexisted peacefully, but soon private breeders recognised that this public distribution culture 
was at odds with their view of  the “seed as a commodity form”,31 and put pressure on the public sector 
to  retract.  In  1890,  56  seed  companies  in  the  United  States  formed  the  American  Seed  Trade 
Association,  which  instigated  an  assault  on  public  breeding.  Though  their  attempts  were  initially 
unsuccessful,  after  the  First  World  War  farmer  participation  in  public  breeding  was  suspended.32 
Successes in corn breeding had created an institutional place for research in other crops, which fostered 
research into other staple crops in the 1940s and 50s. 
27 Evenson in Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade, ed. Maskus, 475.
28 Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 99.
29   Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 11. 
30 Evenson in Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade, ed. Maskus, 475.
31 Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 63.
32 Dutfield in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 30. 
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The landscape of  US agriculture was significantly revolutionised by these changes. According to 
Juma, by the 1940s it was already exhibiting monoculturalism.33 Monoculturalism refers to uniformity in 
two forms -  the genetic uniformity within a crop, and the reliance on a smaller  base of  crops on 
rotation. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the scientific plant breeding endeavours of  the United States 
were significantly internationalised. Through research initiatives led by the Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Ford Foundation, the United States sponsored the establishment of  research institutes on cereal 
crops in Mexico, the Philippines and India. An agreement between the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Mexican Government in 1943 led to the establishment of  a joint research enterprise in wheat. Nobel 
Peace Prize recipient Norman Borlaug working in Mexico in 1944 developed semi-dwarf, high yielding 
varieties of  wheat. Semi-dwarf  varieties have smaller stems, and can thus support a larger number of  
seeds.  The promise  of  higher  yields,  and thereby increased food security,  fostered an international 
demand for  the  so-called high yielding  varieties  (HYVs),  and they  quickly  spread to a  number  of  
nations in the South. 
The spread of  these high yielding seeds to many parts of  the world is known as the Green 
Revolution. The Green Revolution saw the introduction of  a package of  inputs including new seeds, 
new  irrigation  systems  and  chemical  fertilisers,  the  combination  of  which  saw  yields  increase 
dramatically. The spread of  dwarf  varieties of  wheat and rice was coordinated by two international 
centres – the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) and the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in 1965. Pearse records that by 1972-3 there were 16.8 million hectares 
of  HYV wheat and 15.7 million hectares of  HYV rice planted, of  which over 90% was in Asia.34  In 
the 1967 to 1992 period, world rice production doubled. In Indonesia, it tripled.35  India's wheat yields 
rose by one-third after the introduction of  the package,36 which allowed the declaration of  grain self-
sufficiency in 1977.37 
33 Juma, The Gene Hunters, 103.
34 Statistics exclude centrally planned economies, Mexico and Taiwan. Andrew Pearse, Seeds of  Plenty, Seeds of  Want: Social  
and Economic Implications of  the Green Revolution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 38.  
35 David Murray, Seeds of  Concern: The Genetic Manipulation of  Plants. (Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2003), 120.
36 Peter Pringle, Food, Inc: Mendel to Monsanto – The Promises and Perils of  the Biotech Harvest. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2003), 50.
37 Doyle, Altered Harvest, 255.
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The influence of  these crops has lingered - CIMMYT maize is grown on 30 million acres across 
the world38– but the miracle of  the Green Revolution was shortlived. Just four years after declaring 
grain  self  sufficiency,  India  imported  $260  million  US  worth  of  wheat  for  its  reserves.39 The 
combination  of  chemical  inputs  and  intensive  farming  damaged  the  soils  and  displaced  many 
smallholder farmers. Critics of  the revolution attack its social effects, its effects on biodiversity, the 
reliance on chemicals, and the losses in yields over the longer term.40 Yields were not raised through 
miracle seeds, but through the use of  complementary inputs and the promotion of  monocultures at the 
expense of  native cropping systems based on the rotation of  a number of  crops. Some critics are 
extremely vocal against the Green Revolution as a means of  extending and consolidating power over 
the developing world. As Kloppenburg writes, “Western science not only made the seed the catalyst for 
the  dissolution  and  transformation  of  precapitalist  agrarian  social  formations,  it  also  staffed  an 
institutional network that has served as a conduit for the extraction of  plant germplasm from the Third 
World.”41 The result was a transformation of  agricultural practice for large sections of  the world, and 
the increasing reliance on an ever dwindling number of  genetically  uniform varieties of  essential crops. 
Though technology was creating the space for a new private seed industry, the legal framework 
surrounding it was slow to develop. In a sense, the biological characteristics of  hybrid corn provided 
intellectual  property  protection  themselves  through  their  non-replicability.  Other  plants,  however, 
which did breed true required the external protection of  the law. In the United States, the Plant Patent  
Act, enacted in 1930, granted the right to seek patents on varieties of  asexually propagated plants. It 
was, however, too narrow in focus to provide significant protection for plant breeders over the varieties 
they developed. It was not until 1970, with the passing of  the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), that a 
workable domestic legal framework for rights for plant breeders in the United States was put in place. 
The Act created the right for breeders to receive eighteen-year protection certificates over new seed 
plants. It was enacted against the opposition from the Department of  Agriculture, and soon began to 
38 Pat Roy Mooney, Seeds of  the Earth – A Public or Private Resource? (Ottawa, Canada: Inter Pares, 1979), 40.
39 Doyle, Altered Harvest, 255.
40 Mooney, Seeds of  the Earth, 41.
41 Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 15.
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transform the legal and institutional landscape of  United States agriculture.42 According to Juma, the 
effect  of  the  legislation  was  the  gradual  erosion  of  the  seed industry  as  a  distinct  entity,  as  seed 
companies were acquired by larger chemical firms, and the industry became part of  larger corporate 
investment strategies.43  
The PVPA was foreshadowed by international regulation on plant variety protection, the UPOV 
Convention, created in 1961 and entering into force in 1968. UPOV, the Union Internationale pour la 
Protection des Obtentions Végétales,  (International  Union for the Protection of  New Varieties  of  
Plants),  is  an  international  organisation  created  to  coordinate  national  plant  patenting  laws.   At  a 
meeting  in  November  1961  members,  predominantly  European  states,  developed  the  Convention, 
which created plant variety protection in  the form of  plant breeders'  rights.  Rights  are granted to 
varieties  provided  that  they  are  novel,  distinct  and stable.  The Convention  included  provisions  to 
harmonise the intellectual property regulations over plants in its signatory nations, and gave detailed 
direction on the protections to be afforded new plant varieties. The Convention was amended in 1978 
and 1991, the 1991 amendments extending the length of  protection from 15 to 20 years. 
Ownership of  plant genetic resources is intrinsically linked to the debates about patenting life in 
general. The debates began with the United States Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which 
it was  ruled that a protein engineered to clean oil spills was capable of  being patented. The court held 
that  “the patentee  has produced a new bacterium with markedly different  characteristics  from any 
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.”44  This opened the door for the 
patenting of  life, a possibility that had never been entertained by case law before. Patents provided a 
higher level of  protection than PBR, and were thus a highly sought after type of  protection. The case 
led to a wave of  patent applications over plant varieties,  seeds and DNA sequences. In the 1980s, 
concern was raised about the concentration of  patent ownership in a small number of  corporate hands, 
as companies consolidated their hold on resources through mergers and acquisitions. Mooney refers to 
42 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 138.
43 Juma, The Gene Hunters, 82.
44 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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these corporate actors  as  the “new seedsmen”,45 who make business through the consolidation of  
agricultural and chemical interests.  These companies are accused of  creating seed chemical packages, 
that is, tying seed directly to chemical inputs, and deriving profit from both.
Since  the  Green  Revolution,  advances  in  biotechnology  have  abounded.  The  potential  of  
biotechnology  to  dramatically  alter  the  performance  of  the  seed  has  led  many  to  herald  a  gene 
revolution, and to entrust to biotechnology the task of  redressing the failings of  the Green Revolution. 
In 1973, two researchers in the United States discovered the technology to split DNA, insert a foreign 
gene  and recombine  the  DNA to  incorporate  the  new gene.  This  discovery  greatly  enhanced  the 
possibilities of  biotechnology to harness the plant genome and alter the genetic makeup of  crops. 
Biotechnology  can be  applied  to  the  seed in  several  ways.  It  can introduce  a  foreign  gene into  a 
genome, it can control the manifestation of  a specific trait and it can improve the transmission of  a 
particular  trait.  Specific  applications include enhancing the  herbicide  tolerance  of  crops,  increasing 
virus  resistance  and  lengthening  shelf-life  of  perishable  crops.46 Biotechnologies  are  extremely 
important as they allow scientists to target the most desirable traits in crops, and thereby produce seeds 
with higher yields and resistance to certain pests. 
 Advances in biotechnology have highlighted the need to conserve the world's plant genetic 
resources,  the  raw  materials  from  which  scientists  build  their  new  varieties.  In  the  1970s  the 
international network of  research centres such as the CIMMYT and the IRRI was consolidated under 
the  guidance  of  the  Consultative  Group  on  International  Agricultural  Research  (CGIAR).  These 
International  Agricultural  Research Centres (IARCs) are responsible for housing vast stores of  the 
world's germplasm resources. Despite their work, much of  the global germplasm has already been lost, 
particularly wild races. Some critics are wary of  both the practices and the mandates of  these centres. 
“The Third World...”, writes Mooney, “is being invited to put all of  its eggs in someone else's basket.”47 
Despite their status as public institutions, there is concern about loss of  control and sovereignty over 
45 Mooney, Seeds of  the Earth, 55.
46 Gyorgy Scrinis,  Colonizing the Seed:  Genetic Engineering and Techno-Industrial Agriculture.  (Melbourne: Friends of  the Earth, 
1995), 16.
47 Mooney, Seeds of  the Earth, 30.
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resources, particularly from weak nation-states of  the South. 
Increasing concern about the management of  the world's plant genetic resources led to the 
creation of  the International Board of  Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). The new organisation did 
nothing to dissipate concerns that the resources were being controlled by a small number of  countries. 
The 1984 budget of  the organisation was provided almost entirely by six nations, and the Board is not 
subject  to  any  control  by  the  United  Nations.48 In  1977,  65.8% of  the  budget  went  towards  the 
resources  of  industrialised  nations,  and  the  share  that  went  to  the  United  States  far  exceeded  its 
contribution.49
Two other international agreements shaped the late 20th century legal landscape in seeds - the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 1994 Trade Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights  
(TRIPS) Agreement. The Convention on Biological Diversity affirms national sovereignty over genetic 
resources. The Article 3 of  the CBD states that “the authority to determine access to genetic resources 
rests with the national government and is subject to national legislation.”50 This, in theory, gives nations 
significant scope to restrict the flow of  genetic resources across borders. The provision illustrates the 
inherent conflict in the protection of  plant genetic resources – that there are both humanitarian and 
commercial reasons to conserve biological diversity.51
TRIPS is a key multilateral agreement which promotes standardisation of  intellectual property 
regimes. The TRIPS Agreement explicitly links, for the first time, the international trading system and 
intellectual property. Article 27.3 (b) is the relevant provision for plant genetic materials, stating that 
“contracting parties shall provide for the protection of  plant varieties by patents and/or by an effective 
'sui generis  system'.”52 This means that although a patent system is not mandatory on plant varieties, 
some form of  IP system is. Micro-organisms, non-biological processes and microbiological processes 
must be protected under IP law. Many developing countries, including India and Brazil, opposed the 
48 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 25.
49 Mooney, Seeds of  the Earth, 23.
50 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) Article 3: Principle. www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf
51 Jack Kloppenburg and Daniel Lee Kleinman, “Plant Genetic Resources: The Common Bowl” in Seeds and Sovereignty, ed. 
Kloppenburg, 9. 
52 Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS)  (1994)  Article  27.  3(b) 
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regulations on intellectual property, arguing that IP was outside the mandate of  the WTO.53 What is 
meant by an effective sui generis  system has been the centre of  debate. Some countries have exploited 
the  openness  of  the  provision  to  create  systems  which  make  provision  for  the  contribution  of  
traditional communities to plant germplasm.
Over the past century, and particularly post World War II, the environment of  seeds has been 
transformed, both legally and scientifically.  Technological and scientific development have created a 
means through which to commodify the seed, and legal regulations have fortified the institutional space 
around it. The development of  the seed as a commodity has occurred unevenly across the world, but 
increasing international standardisation has put pressure on developing nations to adopt the same legal 
protections for plant genetic resources. This development jeopardises other forms of  ownership and 
management  of  the  seed  and puts  pressure  on agricultural  producers  to conform to  restructured 
agricultural practice.  
2.4 A Global Food System
The 20th century marks a considerable shift in the transformation of  man's relationship with the 
environment and with agricultural practice. These changes include a shift towards mechanisation, the 
tendency  towards  large-scale  farming,  and a  vast  reduction  in  the  numbers  of  people  engaged in 
agriculture.  Over  the  course  of  the  20th century,  capital  inputs  from  the  non-agricultural  sector, 
including machinery and chemicals, have come to substitute labour inputs, and have created enormous 
increases in crop yields.54 According to the authors of  Whose Common Future?, “'[a]griculture', in effect, 
has been redefined to mean 'economically competitive food production'.”55 Transformed agricultural 
practice has contributed to the foundation of  a comprehensive industrial food system upon which 
much of  the world depends.56
This transformation is particularly evident in the agricultural sectors of  the developed world, 
53 Pedro Roffe, “Bringing Minimum Global Intellectual Property Standards into Agriculture: The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights” in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 50.
54 Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 37.
55 The Ecologist, Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons. (London: Earthscan, 1993), 52.
56 Helen Norbert- Hodge, Peter Goering and John Hodge. “From Global to Local: Sowing the Seeds of  Community” in 
Gregory Pence, ed. The Ethics of  Food. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 193.
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where, Pringle states, yields of  wheat, corn and rice doubled in the second half  of  the 20th century, and 
the  number  of  tractors  rose  from seven to twenty-eight  million.57 Emphasis  on  staple  crops  with 
improved yields has led to a decrease in both research in and production of  other crops and a tendency 
towards monoculturalism. Today, three-quarters of  our diet is made up of  just eight crops.58 Doyle 
describes  this  as  a  type  of  “house-of-cards  agriculture”,59 with  a  foundation  that,  through genetic 
uniformity in crops, becomes ever narrower.
The last one hundred years have seen a transformation in the way that food is produced and 
consumed around the world. They have catalysed the creation of  a new institutional structure for food 
policy  that  is  built  around  international  organisations  such  as  the  FAO,  the  WTO  and  the  UN 
Environment Program (UNEP).60 The globalisation of  food production has brought new regulatory 
challenges  and  increasingly  disconnected  consumers  from  the  foods  they  consume.  Critics  have 
warned about the unsustainability of  our current mode of  food production. The reliance on non-
renewable inputs such a fuels, the instability of  climates and the existence of  “complex, but inherently 
fragile,  scientifically  informed global  information networks”61 that bind this  system together are all 
cause for concern about the continued ability to generate enough food to support the world's growing 
population without causing irreparable damage to the environment.
In the middle of  this concern stands the seed, a resource vital for agricultural development but 
increasingly tangled in webs of  ownership and entitlement that jeopardise the ability of  farmers to 
produce it and innovators to share their advancements. A better understanding of  the justifications for 
the property dimensions of  this problem can help to create a clearer picture for the future of  seed 
management. 
57 Peter Pringle, Food Inc.,  14-15.
58 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 8.
59 Doyle, Altered Harvest, 17.
60 Geoff  Tansey, “Food, Farming and Global Rules”, in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 5.
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3. Theories of  Property
3.1 Property Theory
The conflicts over the world's plant genetic resources, while they have political, cultural and 
social implications, are essentially proprietary questions. The root of  the current situation, in which 
pressure is placed on the ability of  farmers to control their inputs, and on the preservation of  the 
world's genetic resources, is the existence of  conflicting ideas about their management and ownership. 
Property theory explores the ways in which individuals or entities hold rights to objects and how those 
objects are constructed as valuable. It also examines the legal and institutional frameworks that provide 
protection for those who hold resources against potential competing claims to ownership.62 Property 
theorists argue for a conception of  property as a social institution which is created by the context of  
the society which it manages, and is a reflection of  dominant powers' interests.63
Property theory has been dominated by a conceptual dichotomy between public and private 
property.  This  distinction delineates  those resources that  are subject  to  joint  ownership and those 
subject  to  individual  ownership.  According  to  Wiber,  public  and  private  property  within  Western 
discourse are considered to exist in a binary, and are competing to displace each other.64 In recent 
scholarship the concept of  public property has been more closely examined. Management by the state, 
for example, is of  a different character than management by a community in a commons. Generally, 
property is  now divided into four main types – private, open access, common, and state regimes.65 
Private property refers to a system where ownership is concentrated in the hands of  individuals, and 
the limits of  that ownership are clearly defined. Common property is a system in which a specific and 
identifiable group have control over a resource.66 State property regimes are those in which a central 
authority is the owner and manager of  property, and open-access is a system in which the concept of  
62 Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie Wiber,  Changing Properties  of  Property. (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 6. 
63 Christopher May,  A Global Political Economy of  Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures?  (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 16.
64 Melanie Wiber, The Voracious Appetites of  Public versus Private Property: A View of  Intellectual Property and Biodiversity from Legal  
Pluralism. CAPRI Working Paper 40, IFRPI,  2.
65 Elinor Ostrom, “Private and Common Property Rights”, in  Encyclopedia of  Law and Economics,  Vol. II:  Civil  Law and  
Economics (Ghent, Belgium: University of  Ghent, 2000),  335.
66 Ostrom, “Private and Common Property Rights”, 335.
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exclusion does not exist, and in which any contribution to a resource by a user is for the benefit of  all. 
3.2 Theory of  Private Property
In the modern world, private property is a dominant form of  resource organisation. Ownership 
in individual hands was a product of  the 15th century enclosure movements in England. A series of  
government statutes over the 15th to the 19th century segregated land that was held in common and 
created private entitlement over it, leading to the displacement of  the commoners and the creation of  a 
class  of  landless  labourers.  Philosophers  and  legal  theorists  sought  to  explain  and  justify  the 
phenomenon by which the commons, the primary land management system, were seized, demarcated 
and controlled by private landlords. One of  the most popular theories espoused is the Labour Theory 
of  Value from Locke's Two Treatises of  Government, which states that when a person mixes their labour 
with an object, they remove it from its natural state and it becomes theirs. Locke states of  man - 
the labour of  his body and the work of  his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of  
the state of  that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with and joyned to it something that 
is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.67 
This theory is based on the assumptions that resources have no value, and in their natural state belong 
to no one. Justifications for private property under this theory are said to be instrumentalist – property 
law encourages human endeavour by providing reward for labour. 
Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Right  is  another  popular  justification  for  private  property,  in  which 
ownership of  property is  the expression of  an individual's  freedom and personality.  Appropriating 
property is done through an actualisation of  will, through occupation or declaration. Other theories of  
property include moral entitlement theory, which states that individuals are entitled to property rights in 
things because they have a special relationship with the thing that they claim,68  and utilitarian theory 
advocates private property as the most efficacious for society. According to May, the image of  property 
shifted dramatically  in  the 17th Century.  At  this  point,  he says,  “there  was a move to conceive  of  
property as something that could  only  be owned privately.”69 This contributes to contemporary view 
67 John Locke, Two Treatises of  Government [1689] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 287-288. 
68 Anthony Stenson and Tim Gray, “Cultural Communities and Intellectual Property in Plant Genetic Resources” in Justice,  
Property  and  the  Environment  –  Social  and  Legal  Perspectives  ed.  Tim Hayward  and  John  O'Neill.  (Aldershot/Vermont: 
Ashgate, 1997), 178.
69 May, A Global Political Economy of  Intellectual Property Rights, 23.
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that there is a single theory of  property, one that does not accommodate the multiple ways in which 
resources can be held and managed. 
Classical economics views private property as the optimal system of  resource management.70 
Private  property  organisation  and  the  market  system are  considered  to  be  complimentary,  a  view 
predicated on the belief  that the institution of  private property is the best system for allocating scarce 
resources, as it attributes to an individual entity both the costs and benefits of  the use of  a resource.71 
Property is said to have evolved from a system in which group rights were standard, to one in which 
individual rights are privileged.72 The theory of  propertisation sees the spread of  private property as an 
inevitable development. As Esther Kingston-Mann states, “[i]n discourses of  privatisation we enter a 
world of  myth and romance where courageous architects of  private property rights confront starkly 
dichotomised choices between progress and backwardness.”73 
The concept of  a right is intrinsic to private property. As Demsetz states, “[p]roperty rights are 
an instrument of  society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those 
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.”74 Rights in property are held 
and asserted against other individuals. Often, private property is referred to as a bundle of  rights, a set 
of  certain entitlements to it. According to Ostrom, this bundle is made up of  any of  five principal 
rights: the right to access the property; the right to retain units of  it; the right to manage it; the right to 
exclude others from it; and rights to alienation, including rights to sell or lease it. In economic terms, 
Ostrom states that alienation is the most important right.75
2.3 Theory of  Intellectual Property
Intellectual Property, as a facet of  the private property, encompasses a number of  legal protections over 
intangible creations of  the mind. Intellectual property (IP) offers rights to own, use, sell and market an 
70 Carol Rose, “The Comedy of  the Commons: Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public Property”, University of  Chicago  
Law Review 53, 711 (1986): 110.
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invention  for  a  limited  period  of  time.  Types  of  IP  protection  include:  patents,  which  protect 
inventions for a fixed period of  time against appropriation, sale or use of  third parties;  copyright, 
which protects the expression of  creative ideas; and trademarks, which protect designs, labels and logos 
relating to the product of  a company. 
As laws  that  govern non-physical  objects,  intellectual  property  rights  require  some level  of  
abstraction, and the acceptance that ideas are allocable to one individual creator.76 According to May, 
there is a clear divide between the function of  IPR in theory and in practice. Knowledge objects, unlike 
physical property, are not vulnerable to scarcity. Vital to the operation of  IP is therefore, he argues, the 
construction of  knowledge as scarce.77 It involves a conception of  ideas as “separable and transferable 
knowledge objects”78  rather than recognising that the construction of  knowledge is often collaborative 
or incremental. There is an inherently political element to intellectual property, in that it determines the 
types of  knowledge and creative expression which can be classified as property.79 
Most justifications for intellectual property are utilitarian, they argue that the protection will 
encourage  further  innovation,  and  thus  benefit  society  at  large.80 Innovators  must  be  given  some 
incentive to invent, and intellectual property laws guarantee them this incentive. Critics are wary of  the 
tendency  of  these  incentives  to  lead  to  monopoly,  stifling  innovation  rather  than  encouraging  it. 
Intellectual property rights can be used to push competitors from the market, reducing the number of  
innovators  in  a  particular  field.  Further,  many  have  criticised  the  link  between  high  levels  of  IP 
protection and high levels of  development. Lee Branstetter, in examining the impact of  increased IP 
protections  in  developing  countries,  found  no  significant  relationship  between  a  higher  level  of  
intellectual  property  protection  and  local  innovation.81 James  Boyle,  in  his  article  “The  Second 
Enclosure Movement”, argues that the rise of  intellectual property protections is  another form of  
76 Carol Rose, “Possession as the Origin of  Property” in Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of  
Ownership. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 80.
77 May, A Global Political Economy of  Intellectual Property Rights, 42.
78 May, A Global Political Economy of  Intellectual Property Rights, 47.
79 Tansey, “Food, Farming and Global Rules” in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 13.
80 Tansey,“Food, Farming and Global Rules” in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 14.
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enclosure and links the increase in IPR strength directly with the creation of  private property rights in 
15th Century  England.  He  argues  that  the  economic  evidence for  increasing  IP protections  is  not 
convincing, and only serves to create an environment conducive to monopolies and cartels.82 Echoing 
many other IP critics, he argues that rather than just providing incentives for innovation, IPRs have 
become a significant political and economic tool.83
Intellectual  property  law  has  always  been  subject  to  national  jurisdiction.  Though  there  is 
evidence of  invention protection tracing back to 15th century Italy, comprehensive IP regimes are the 
product of  the late 19th to 20th centuries. International negotiations in intellectual property began with 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of  Industrial Property in 1883, and the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of  Literary  and  Artistic  Works in  1886.  Though  these  Conventions  brought  together  a  number  of  
countries to elucidate the principles of  IP law, they did not create any standardisation of  laws.84 The 
Paris Convention did not define the term invention, and left it to individual nations to determine what 
was covered.85 IP law still  remains firmly within the rubric of  domestic  regulation, and intellectual 
property regimes offering various levels of  protection exist in different countries of  the world.
Since  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  scope  of  IP  law has  expanded considerably.  According  to 
Dutfield, this expansion is three-fold – a widening of  the subject matter that falls under the protection 
of  IP,  the creation of  new rights  (including plant breeders'  rights)  and the increasing international 
standardisation  of  IP  regimes.86  By  the  end of  the  1970s  most  countries  had  patent  regulations 
covering  pharmaceuticals,  but  recourse  to  patenting  of  plant  genetic  resources  was  mixed.87 The 
patenting of  life has been a gradual process, and most developing countries continue to exhibit weaker 
IP protection in this area.88  Following  Diamond v Chakrabarty, a series of  directives from the United 
States  and European patent  offices  indicated  a  widening  of  subject  material,  from seeds,  to  plant 
82 James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of  the Public Domain”,  Law and Contemporary  
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tissues,  to  DNA. In these developments,  the  United States  was  the  frontrunner.  A 1989  European  
Directive on the Legal Protection of  Biotechnological Inventions took nine years to be adopted, and only four 
countries to this point have fully incorporated it into domestic law.89 
Internationally, IP is supervised by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which 
became a UN agency in 1974. WIPO's mandate is to foster economic and social development through 
the transfer of  technology.90 Though the organisation has created many directives for the operation of  
IP regulation, the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
has had the most impact on the international IP landscape. The TRIPS Agreement significantly altered 
the international IP environment by pushing for a standardisation of  IP regulation across its signatory 
countries in the duration, type and subject matter of  protection. 
3.4 The Concept of  the Commons
Originally, the term commons was used to refer to the system of  land management that was 
replaced by private ownership during the enclosure movement. Until quite recently, the 'commons' were 
viewed as  the inefficient  and outmoded precedent  to private property organisation.  This  view was 
largely  created  by  Garrett  Hardin's  “The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons”.  In  “The  Tragedy  of  the 
Commons”,   Hardin claimed that individuals in a world of  limited resources will seek to maximise 
their own gains over pursuing the common good, and thus that the commons system of  landholding is 
doomed to fail.  “The rational  man,” wrote Hardin,  “finds that his  share of  the cost of  wastes he 
discharges is less than the cost of  purifying his wastes before discharging them. Since this is true for 
everyone,  we  are  locked  into  a  system  of  'fouling  our  own  nest'  so  long  as  we  behave  only  as 
independent, rational, free enterprisers.”91 The article was a condemnation of  common property as a 
management  system,  which  assumed  that  self  interest  would  overwhelm  any  ability  to  manage 
resources communally. 
Since the 1980s,  this  image of  the commons has been challenged by a group of  common 
89 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries, 152.
90 Maria  Julia  Oliva,  “Promoting  and  Extending the  Reach  of  Intellectual  Property:  The World Intellectual  Property 
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91 Hardin, “The Tragedy of  the Commons”,  44.
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scholars. These scholars have argued for a more nuanced view of  common ownership. They challenge 
the simple dichotomy of  public/private resources and divide the concept of  public ownership into 
different systems based on their  operation,  their  structure and the resource to which they pertain. 
Common property scholars argued for more nuanced understandings of  the term 'commons', asserting 
the  difference between open access  and common pool  resources.92 A common pool  resource is  a 
“resource used by a group of  appropriators  that  is  both non-excludable and depletable.”93 Ostrom 
argued that what Hardin described in “The Tragedy of  the Commons” was actually an open-access 
system,94 one in which all people could use resources without restriction, and not a commons, in which 
a fixed number of  managers governed the resource. Unlike an open-access regime, the commons have 
a social infrastructure – cultural institutions, norms and traditions which bind members and the way 
they treat their resources.95 Those in a common property management system also have the right to 
exlude non-members.96 According to Bromley, a property system can best be understood as a type of  
authority system, and a commons authority system is based on reciprocal rights and duties among co-
owners.97 According to Ostrom, “common property regimes controlling access and harvesting from 
local streams, forests, grazing areas and inshore fisheries have evolved over long periods of  time in all 
parts  of  the  world,  but  were  rarely  given  formal  status  in  the  legal  codes  of  newly  independent 
countries.”98 Rather than an ungoverned anarchical space characterised by misuse and exhaustion of  
resources, the commons are a viable system of  property in their own right, capable of  being effectively 
and responsibly managed. 
In a volume entitled Whose Common Future? the authors of  The Ecologist remind us that “for 
the vast majority of  humanity, the commons are an everyday reality.”99 They add, “the modern nation 
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state has been built only by stripping power and control from common regimes and creating structures 
of  governance from which the great mass of  humanity (particularly women) are excluded.”100 Far from 
being a marginalised system in the modern world, commons are prevalent in many areas of  the world, 
especially in the management of  natural resources. 
Over time, the concept of  the commons has been extended beyond its application to land 
management to refer to any resource that is managed communally. The term is now often used to refer 
to the environment - the global commons – resources which are said to be held in common by all 
humankind. It is used to invoke a sense of  custodianship over the world's resources, such as oceans and 
the atmosphere, and to encourage their conservation. According to Goldman, the term has become the 
“central metaphor of  environmental politics”,101 which is either responsible for or detrimental to good 
environmental management. Some, including the authors of  Whose Common Future, take issue with the 
way the term is used, and recognise that “by designating the atmosphere and biodiversity as 'global 
commons', the World Bank and other agencies have overridden the local claims of  those who rely on 
the  real  commons.”102 Treating  the  commons  as  an  abstract  principle,  scholars  and  international 
organisations alike are diminishing the salience of  claims to common ownership. 
The term is also used to refer to intellectual commons, describing the space for past innovation, 
and  a  creative  environment  to  encourage  further  innovation.103 An  extension  of  this  idea  is  the 
scientific  commons.  Generally,  the  scientific  community  has  been  underpinned  by  a  culture  of  
facilitating and enhancing knowledge and understanding, and thus based on openness and publishing 
of  results.104 However, shifts in the attitudes of  universities in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of  
patents have threatened this scientific commons, and the operation of  scientific knowledge as a public 
good, an input available to produce future knowledge.105
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Recently  open-access has been associated with open-source computer software,  referring to 
operating systems and programs that are free and accessible, but are only capable of  being used, not 
being owned. Users who access the software are free to use and add to it, but hold no title to it in 
property.  The  sudden  spread  and  popularity  of  such  software  has  illustrated  that  the  form  of  
ownership it engages is actually not as new a phenomenon as was thought. Some have argued that 
applying the open-source software model to biotechnology is a way to circumvent the existence of  an 
overwhelming number  of  IP  rights  exerted over  plants,  genes  and plant  breeding  processes.  They 
advocate open-access as a principle that could promote openness and advancement in science.106
These four types of  property are all relevant in historical and contemporary management of  
seed.  20th century  seed  management  is  characterised  by  a  conflict  between  common  and  private 
property paradigms. With the diminished ability of  the commons to operate, and the failure to institute 
any workable schema of  common management in the international arena, new solutions have been 
proposed to overcome the impasse. State and open-access management are two possible solutions, each 
of  which suggests new ways of  managing seed as a commodity. 
4. Property and the Seed
4.1 Property Theory and the Seed
Applying a property analysis to the plant genetic resource debate is an important step, because 
it  reveals that the seed is viewed and valued in different ways by different actors.  It  illustrates that 
private property in seeds was not created in a void, but has commodified a resource that was already 
subject to other forms of  ownership. The creation of  intellectual property rights was facilitated by a 
congruence of  favourable legal and technological circumstances that emerged in the United States at 
the turn of  the century. It was consolidated internationally into a dominant property system through a 
discriminatory mechanism of  value which draws a distinction between raw and elite germplasm, and 
Public Goods” in International Public Goods and Transfer of  Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, ed. Maskus 
and Reichman, 41.
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grants monetary value to only elite varieties.
The discriminatory way that value and worth are calculated in seeds is at the centre of  conflicts 
over their ownership. Seeds are a part of  the natural world and a resource upon which we all depend, 
and thus are priceless. Assigning them a monetary value, however illogical it may seem, is an integral 
part  of  their  commodification.  Private property rights in seeds,  following the tenets  of  intellectual 
property,  are extended only to those varieties which are deemed to involve an inventive step.  This 
excludes landraces - varieties developed under traditional breeding methods. By deeming traditional 
varieties part of  the common heritage of  mankind, their continued and uncompensated use as building 
blocks for propertised varieties is legitimised. 
Whether they choose not to use propertised seed, are restricted by financial circumstances or by 
the research priorities of  biotech firms, many farmers across the world continue to use landraces as 
their primary input. The challenge for the private property regime has been to ensure that varieties 
protected by intellectual property rights do not fall back into common property forms of  management. 
It has succeeded through favourable technological circumstances and clever manipulation of  the tenets 
of  property law. 
The interaction and conflict between common and private property management in seeds did 
not end with the issuing of  the first patent. It is a divide that continues to shape the property landscape, 
and one that manifests itself  differently in different parts of  the world. Responses to the growth of  
private property control have not been uniform or unified.  New ways of  owning have displaced old 
ways  of  owning,  and  those  opposing  the  spread  of  private  property  have  both  contradicted  and 
supported  it  –  making  claims  for  compensation  within  it  while  simultaneously  calling  for  its 
abandonment. Solutions for farmers in which they receive compensation for their resources, or access 
to elite varieties of  the North free of  charge, ignore the fact that common property and and private 
property  are  not  just  conflicting  ideas  about  how plants  should  be  held  but  are  tied  to  complex 
institutions, to legal cultures and to ways of  assigning value.   
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4.2 Common Property in Seeds
Long before the advent of  private property regulation on plant genetic material, farmers as 
collective and individual agents controlled the seeds they harvested, a renewable, genetically diverse set 
of  resources that could be selected, traded and interbred within that community of  farmers. These 
resources were held as part of  commons of  farmers who managed the resource both individually and 
collectively. Kloppenburg describes the environment prior to the 1930s as constituted by “largely open 
systems that operated on the basis of  reciprocity and gift exchange rather than the market. Indeed,” he 
continues, “these customary arrangements usually functioned to stimulate and facilitate – rather than 
restrict – the wide dissemination of  seed.”107 
The commons are for a significant share of  the world's population an everyday reality,108 and 
this is also true of  the management of  seeds.  Propertised seed varieties are used in many parts of  the 
developing world, but their use is not uniform across the nations of  the South, and they have not been 
established  to  any  notable  extent  in  Africa.  According  to  the  Rural  Advancement  Foundation 
International (RAFI), in a study published in 1997, approximately 90% of  the food requirements of  the 
South are met through local domestic production, and two-thirds are based on community farming 
systems.109
Seed management  in  community  farming  systems is  not  devoid  of  rules,  but  is  guided by 
management principles of  its own. As Gepts writes, “one of  the essential rules is the reciprocity in 
access among farmers and plant breeders across economic sectors and national borders.”110 Brush adds 
that in these systems, invention is a collective enterprise, and that artificial and natural selection of  seed 
attributes are linked.111 “Neither common heritage”, he writes, “nor common property implies a lack of  
rules  (res  nullius)...  Rather  they imply  community management  (res  communes) that  involves regulated 
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access to common resources and reciprocity among users.”112 
From a theoretical perspective, seeds can be viewed as any other resource held in common. 
Unlike land however, seeds as a resource are extremely mobile, and the duration of  their development 
and  improvement  makes  it  difficult  to  trace  to  a  distinct  group of  custodians.  This  difficulty  of  
assignment is not just a product of  the resource in question but of  the way in which theory of  the 
commons has developed.  Seeds,  too,  have been caught up in  the  perception that  property can be 
characterised by a dichotomy of  private and public. Initiatives of  public institutions and international 
breeding programs have been differentiated from private sector breeding, a rise in the latter having 
diminished the importance of  the former.113 However, public ownership and common ownership are 
not synonymous. Public breeding by governments must be distinguished from traditional breeding of  
landraces. In the light of  the CBD, and principles of  national sovereignty over natural resources, state 
sovereignty must also be distinguished from ownership in common. 
The term common, when referring to plant genetic resources, is employed in several different 
ways. The term is used to refer to communities of  farmers who develop plant varieties using traditional 
methods, to a global pool of  resources liable to depletion, to part of  our shared heritage, and to the 
culture of  science that should surround plant variety development. Mary Footer explains the difficulties 
of  applying  the  commons  principle  to  plant  genetic  resources  in  her  article  “A  Tale  of  Two 
Commons”.  She  states  that  there  are  two  commons  in  agriculture  –  the  global  commons  of  
humankind's germplasm resources, and the “anthropocentric localized commons” of  seeds.114 These 
localised commons link plant genetic resources to local cultural values and the need to preserve both 
agricultural  and  cultural  heritage.115 She  traces  the  global  commons  from  the  creation  of  the 
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) in the 1960s and their consolidation under the 
CGIAR under the norm of  free exchange of  plant genetic material.116 These institutions were created 
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to foster research and preservation of  crops under a public goods culture. The global commons, she 
states,  have  been  enclosed  by  the  provisions  of  the  CBD,  which  consolidate  control  of  genetic 
resources under national  sovereignty.  The localised commons,  on the other  hand,  are made up of  
groups of  traditional producers, who “continue to pursue a tradition that allows for diversified and 
heterogeneous  agricultural  production,  relying  on  a  mixture  of  wild  species  (landraces)  and 
domesticated species of  crop germplasm to ensure agricultural biodiversity.”117 These commons too, 
are in danger of  being enclosed by the market, and by the growth of  proprietary rights.118  
Ostrom and Rose have developed a theory known as the limited commons which can also be 
applied to the management of  seeds. It describes a system in which a resource may be viewed as a 
private resource to the wider world, but within a group or community is treated as a common resource. 
These limited commons, according to Ostrom, can have  very loose governance structures.119 Where 
such limited commons exist, a resource is only partially commodified.120 Keith Aoki applies this model 
to  the  property  environment  in  seeds,  stating  that  in  a  regime  characterised  by  strengthening  IP 
protections, a limited commons theory can explain why some resources have not been subject to it, and 
continue to be managed in common.121 Partial commodification is evident in the tensions between 
commoditised and non-commoditised seed, between elite germplasm and raw germplasm.
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR), created in 2001, 
can be seen as a type of  limited commons. In this document, common heritage is sidelined in favour of  
such principles as sustainable use and benefit sharing in line with the CBD,122and a multilateral system 
for sharing plant genetic resources for food and agriculture is created. The Treaty lists the over sixty 
food crops and forages that form the basis of  that system, and states that facilitated access to these 
resources must not be limited by IP.  The Treaty has been ratified by over one hundred countries. 
ITPGR represents a new strategy in overcoming conflicts of  ownership over seed. 
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Prior to the implementation of  the ITPGR another international document, the  International  
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, affirmed the principle that the world's genetic resources were the 
“common heritage of  mankind”.  There can be no clearer  example  of  the  way in  which the  term 
commons has been distorted than the common heritage principle.  The common heritage principle, 
elucidated in the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of  the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and 
the 1982 Law of  the Sea Convention, was used to declare that cultural heritage sites, the seabed, and areas 
of  Antarctica should not be under the sovereignty of  nation-states but should remain the common 
heritage of  all peoples. 
Concerns about germplasm freely collected from nations of  the South subsequently providing 
the genetic material for the development of  propertised varieties led to a series of  debates known as 
the 'seed wars' at the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of  the UN. Developing nations, led by 
delegations  from  Mexico,  campaigned  for  a  legally  binding  convention  which  would  ensure  free 
exchange of  plant genetic resources.123 What resulted instead was the creation in 1983 of  the non-
legally binding  International Undertaking on Plant Genetic  Resources  (IUPGR). The IUPGR declared that 
plant  genetic  resources  were  the  common  heritage  of  mankind  and  should  be  available  without 
restriction. It did not expressly recognise plant breeders' rights, the subject of  the UPOV Convention in 
1961.  
Developed countries were generally wary of  the negotiations, and wanted advanced varieties 
and material in breeding programs to be exempt from the common heritage principle. According to 
Mooney, these exclusions would have “simply put under force of  international law the 'right' of  the 
'poor' to 'fully and freely' donate their botanical treasures to the rich and affirm the right of  the 'rich' to 
receive such raw materials.”124 Despite its  proclamation that all  plant genetic material was common 
heritage,  eight countries  issued reservations on the Undertaking to exempt elite  germplasm.125 The 
IUPGR was concluded in 1983, without the United States, Japan or Canada as signatories.
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The  common  heritage  principle,  while  attempting  to  give  salience  to  common  property 
ownership, actually became a justification for the use of  exotic germplasm by breeders as their building 
blocks without compensation. As Drahos notes, 
common heritage is an ambiguous concept. It may mean that a resource is not subject  to ownership...and 
therefore it is open to anyone to appropriate, or it  may mean that the resource is the subject of  common 
ownership and cannot be appropriated without the consent of  all.126 
Conflict arose because the existence of  a legally fortified system of  private property in plant genetic 
resources fostered the belief  that the term meant the former and not the latter.  As Kloppenburg and 
Kleinman state, “ironically, in a world economic system based on private property, each side wants to 
define the possessions of  the other as a common good.”127 The common heritage of  mankind concept 
only highlighted the unbalanced way in which germplasm resources are treated in the international legal 
environment. These problems, coupled with the scepticism of  common ownership created by Hardin's 
“Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  have  led  to  the  diminishment  of  the  common  heritage  principle  in 
international law and policy. 
Proponents of  the commons system of  ownership have been very vocal about the ways in 
which the private property regime has displaced and devalued other forms of  ownership. Livelihood 
Award  winner  Vandana  Shiva,  for  example,  has  deplored  the  emphasis  private  property  puts  on 
individual rights, stating that such a system “excludes all kinds of  knowledge, ideas and innovations that 
take place in the intellectual commons, in villages among farmers...  and even in universities among 
scientists.”128 It is not just rights that are affected, but also the seed, and its value as a biological entity. 
In her volume Monocultures of  the Mind, Shiva adds that “[p]atenting of  genes thus leads to a devaluation 
of  life forms by reducing them to their constituent parts and allowing them to be repeatedly owned as 
private property. This reductionism and fragmentation might be convenient for commercial concerns, 
but it violates the integrity of  life as well as the common property rights of  Third World peoples.”129
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The term commons has been used in multiple and conflicting ways, which has led to a tendency 
to disregard it  as an ownership system. Far from being regarded as a viable and efficient property 
system, proponents of  the private property regime in seeds have adopted the language of  common 
property ownership to advocate their own valuing system, and ignored the substance behind it.  The 
term common has been used as a way to signify lack of  private value, that is, able to be used in the 
private property system without charge. Thus common has become synonymous with free, not shared.
This view ignores the fact that ownership in common has provided significant obstacles for 
private property to consolidate and expand.  As Shiva writes “modern plant-breeding is primarily an 
attempt to eliminate the biological obstacle to the market in seed: its inherent ability to regenerate and 
multiply. Seed that reproduces itself  stays free, a common resource under farmers' control.”130 Once a 
proprietised seed enters back into the commons by purchase, it can theoretically be resdistributed and 
held in common again.  In this  sense the achievement of  the private property regime is  creating a 
market in a commodity that can be so easily converted back into common property.  
4.3 Seeds as Private Property
 Private property management is the newest and most controversial addition to the property 
landscape of  plant genetic resources. It is based primarily on two types of  intellectual property rights – 
patents and plant breeders' rights – that have developed to protect the creations of  scientific plant 
breeders in the second half  of  the 20th  century. The institutional space for such protections opened up 
much earlier, beginning in the 1880s with the discovery of  heterosis, or hybridisation in corn. These 
varieties were protected by virtue of  their biology – their progeny did not carry on the characteristics 
of  their  hybridisation.  Later  developed  plant  varieties  were  not  endowed  with  such  biological 
protections. IPR in plant genetic resources began as a set of  niche rights valid in a few countries of  the 
industrialised  North.  By  the  end  of  the  century,  they  had  become  a  vital  part  of  the  regulatory 
framework  of  a  vastly  altered  global  agricultural  system,  and  a  significant  challenge  to  commons 
management. 
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International  law  on  plant  variety  protection  (PVP)  began  in  the  1960s  with  the  UPOV 
Convention.  The  advent  of  private  protections  on plant  varieties  was  the  result  of  the  dominant 
interests  of  two  groups,  the  International  Association  of  Plant  Breeders  (ASSINSEL),  and  the 
International  Association for the  Protection of  Intellectual  Property  (AIPPI),  which facilitated the 
drafting of  the Convention.131  As Dutfield states, “UPOV was created and shaped by plant breeders 
for  plant  breeders  and they  have a  strong sense  of  ownership of  the  Convention.  Public  interest 
organizations have had minimal involvement.”132 UPOV's detailed provisions have been revised three 
times, the latest revisions in 1991. 
UPOV created the entitlement to plant breeders'  rights  (PBR) over  varieties  of  seed.  Plant 
breeders' rights are now a feature of  most developed country IP regimes. They are a less intensive form 
of  property right than a patent, which only allow the protection of  a product, not a process.133 PBR in 
the 1991 UPOV Convention extends rights over “production or reproduction, conditioning for the 
purposes  of  propagation,  offering  for  sale,  selling  for  other  marketing,  exporting,  importing  or 
stocking” of  plant genetic resources.134 Once registered, the variety, and any other “essentially derived” 
from it is protected. To be eligible for protection an applicant must demonstrate that the variety is new 
and distinct,  genetically  uniform and stable.  The variety does not need to have utility.135 The 1991 
version of  the Convention removes the clause of  earlier versions which permits farmers to save their 
seed for the next season's replanting. 
Until 1970, when the United States enacted a form of  Plant Variety Protection into domestic 
law,  the  impact  of  PVP  under  UPOV had  been  minimal.  According  to  Mooney,  pre-1970  plant 
breeders rights were seen as a “common market, or at best, West European phenomenon.”136 The Plant  
Variety Protection Act,  enacted in 1970 against the recommendation of  the Department of  Agriculture, 
131 Dutfield inThe Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 33.
132 Dutfield in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 34.
133 Juma, The Gene Hunters, 164.
134 International Convention for the Protection of  New Varieties of  Plants (UPOV Convention) (March 19, 1991) Article 
14(1) http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/publications/conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf
135 Carol Nottenburg, Philip G. Pardey and Brian D. Wright, “Addressing Freedom to Operate Questions for International 
Agricultural R&D” in  The Future  of  Food:  Biotechnology  Markets  and Policies  in an International  Setting,  ed. Philip Pardey, 
(Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001), 102.
136 Mooney, Law of  the Seed, 138.
39
granted  eighteen-year  certificates  over  new  seed  plants.  The  effects  of  the  legislation  were  not 
immediate, but were pronounced. It led to an eventual restructuring of  the entire seed industry in the 
United States, with small companies increasingly subsumed in larger conglomerates.137 
In 1980, Diamond v Chakrabarty created the possibility of  another, stronger type of  protection – 
patents – for plant varieties. The decision led to the significant widening of  patentable subject matter. 
Patents  grant  limited-duration  monopolies  over  innovations  including  manufacturing  processes, 
chemical  compositions,  novel  products  and  designs.138 Patent  rights  are  more  desirable  than  PBR 
because they include territorial protection, protection from copying, exclusive rights to make, sell and 
import.139 Further, patents can be granted on a product, on a process, a use bound product patent 
(rights conferred pertain to a certain use) and product by process (a product is protected by virtue of  
the process used to create it).  The extension of  patents to plant varieties has not eliminated plant 
breeders' rights, the two continue to coexist. UPOV's 1991 amendments extend the duration of  PBRs 
to 20 years, making them more patent-like.  
The Green Revolution laid the foundations for the export of  intellectual property protections 
through the distribution of  propertised seed. Though the revolution pulled millions of  people from the 
brink of  starvation and provided food security for target nations of  the South by introducing semi-
dwarf  varieties with higher yields, it also radically restructured agriculture in the areas it reached and 
tied producers into dependency on purchased outputs, including so-called miracle seeds. The revolution 
not  only  created  a  market  for  propertised  seeds  in  areas  of  the  world  that  were  managing  seed 
resources in common, it also set up a network of  research centres which collected exotic germplasm 
from the varieties of  areas of  the South. 
'Enclosing'  the  seed  has  required  a  significant  amount  of  scientific  and  technological 
advancement as well as legal protection. So long as IP protections are uneven, and farmers have the 
ability  to distribute their crops among themselves,  there is  always a risk that the seed will  become 
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common property again, given that “a farmer may purchase seed of  an improved plant variety and can 
consequently propagate the seed indefinitely for future use.”140  As an object capable of  being privately 
owned, the seed relies on a complex web of  legal and technological regulation that is neither universally 
available nor universally accepted. Keeping their product within the realm of  technological and legal 
control is thus of  the utmost importance for those wishing to uphold private property control in seeds. 
In  this  sense,  the  TRIPS  Agreement  was  a  major  achievement  in  the  consolidation  of  
intellectual property protections. The Agreement, formulated at the Uruguay Round of  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), made IP explicitly for the first time a trade issue. It  set 
minimum standards of  protection for IP, incorporating them into the WTO system in full. For the 
purposes of  plant genetic resources, Article 27.3(b) is the relevant provision, and states that micro-
organisms  and  microbiological  process  must  be  covered  by  patent  law,  while  plants,  animals  and 
“essentially  biological  processes” may be exempted from patent protection.  Plant varieties  must be 
protected, whether by patents or an “effective  sui generis  system”.141 What comprises an effective  sui  
generis  system is not specified, though the provisions of  the UPOV Convention are said to fulfil the 
requirements.  Already,  some  nations  with  traditionally  low  intellectual  property  protections  are 
exploiting  the  ambiguity  of  the  provision  to  provide  compensation  and  rights  to  farmers  and 
indigenous  populations.  The  impacts  of  the  Agreement  are  so  far  difficult  to  assess,  developing 
countries were to enact it by 2005, while least developed countries have until 2013. Regardless, it is clear 
that TRIPS represents a significant expansion and consolidation of  intellectual property protections, 
generally and in the field of  plant genetic resources, around the world.  
Private property requires the attribution of  ownership to one individual or entity. In a resource 
such as seeds, where the existence of  specific traits in a species may be the result of  centuries of  
breeding and development, assigning ownership to one individual is a difficult proposition. Seeds as a 
subject of  private property regulation are significantly different from other privately held resources, and 
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thus, the theory behind private property is difficult to apply to their case. For example, Locke's labour 
theory  of  value  sits  uncomfortably  with  the  reality  of  seed  development.  If  property  is  acquired 
through the mixing of  labour with a resource, then ownership should lie with traditional plant breeders, 
who have been labouring  over  seed varieties  for  centuries,  not  scientific  breeders.  Instead Locke's 
theory has been used in a resolutely narrow way, to support the proposition that the world's resources 
belong to no-one (res nullius) until they are actively seized.142 Secondly, assuming that the utilitarian end 
of  creating intellectual property in seeds is to encourage economic growth, a connection between high 
IP controls over plant genetic resources and economic growth has never been resolutely established. If  
we take moral entitlement theory as the justification, then it is possible to argue that those farmers who 
developed the world's landraces have a greater entitlement to ownership than do IPR holders. 
Extension  of  intellectual  property  over  seeds  also  introduces  some  important  conceptual 
difficulties. One of  the most commonly cited problems with the patenting of  plant genetic material is 
the operation of  the invention/discovery distinction. The invention/discovery distinction is a tenet of  
intellectual property which states that only that which has been invented, not merely discovered, can be 
protected by IPRs. According to Dutfield, allowing the patenting of  genes has created a situation in 
which  “the  invention-discovery  distinction  has  been  blurred  to  the  point  of  becoming  almost 
meaningless.”143 Living things, he argues, cannot be described or be made to perform like mechanical 
processes.144 Instead,  the  true  nature  of  plant  genetic  resources  is  distorted  in  order  to  make  IP 
protection applicable. 
The other requirements for patenting – novelty and industrial applicability – are also difficult to 
apply to plant genetic resources. Wei explains that individual countries have interpreted the requirement 
for novelty differently. Disputes occur about the use of  traditional knowledge, and the extent to which 
the application of  this  knowledge to create new goods can be considered novel.145 The Australian 
patent system, for example, requires for novelty that the knowledge used is not available in written 
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form, which excludes oral traditional knowledge.146 The inventive step in biotechnological research is 
also  faced  with  similar  challenges,  only  knowledge  created  in  a  laboratory  is  considered  to  be 
sufficiently inventive.147
One of  the arguments for private property is that it extends over resources that are scarce, in 
order to prevent their mismanagement. Seeds are a renewable, not a scarce resource, and thus private 
property  protections  over  them  may  hinder  rather  than  help  their  management.  Michael  Heller 
addresses this possibility in his article “The Tragedy of  the Anti-commons”. Referencing the argument 
of  Hardin in the “Tragedy of  the Commons”,  Heller describes the reverse situation,  in which the 
existence of  too many rights of  use over a resource creates an anti-commons, an environment in which 
no one single right-holder has effective use over a resource. The tragedy of  the anti-commons is not 
the overexploitation of  resources as in Hardin's commons but their underexploitation – where no one 
right holder can exercise the privilege of  use.148 The right to exclude others from use is ineffective, and 
thus resources are underconsumed. In plant genetic material these anticommons can be said to exist in 
the overlapping legal entitlements of  different actors in seeds. The absence of  a central international 
authority of  patented plant varieties means that often more than one set of  rights will exist for a single 
variety. An often cited example of  this phenomenon is golden (vitamin A enriched) rice, over which 70 
patents  exist  worldwide.149 Dutfield  claims  that  these  anticommons  situations  are  an  inevitable 
consequence on the way in which the patent system is geared. “There is little”, he writes, “that patent 
offices can do about such 'tragedies' except leave it to the patent holders involved either to accept the 
high transaction costs entailed by their need to acquire or licence other firms' patents or to collaborate 
with their rivals by setting up private collective rights organisations to pool their patents.”150 
IPRs over seeds do not conform to the theory behind private property in tangible or intangible 
assets. Their inclusion under the laws of  intellectual property is a significant distortion of  the tenets 
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that have supported and justified the extension of  rights over other resources. According to Demsetz, 
however, property is a flexible institution which is designed to absorb new resources when potential 
benefit from a good rises.151 As a social institution, property is designed to adapt to the context in 
which it operates, and the emergence of  a market in seeds created the need for an artificial barrier 
against their appropriation. The granting of  intellectual property protections over seeds has been based 
in  the  idea  that  plant  breeders  should  be  rewarded  for  their  efforts  in  creating  new varieties  and 
protected against any unauthorised distribution and use of  them. This is an instrumentalist approach to 
IPRs, which recognises that without such rights, free-riding would completely undermine the incentives 
to  invest  in  developing new varieties.152 Biotechnology is  an extremely  research  intensive  and time 
consuming  field.  It  can  cost  hundreds  of  thousands  of  US  dollars  to  develop  varieties,  and 
understandably the companies  that engage in breeding aim to achieve an adequate return on their 
investments. Rights such as PBRs and patents provide breeders the opportunity to be compensated for 
their work. According to Wilkes, the engineering of  Norin 10, the semi-dwarf  wheat cultivar used in 
the Mexican breeding program and one of  the key inputs for HYV wheat,  has impacted the food 
supply of  one quarter of  the people on the earth.153 The advancements that have been achieved in 
biotechnology  should  not  be  underestimated,  and their  immense  contributions  to  the  global  food 
production capacity should be recognised. 
Despite the existence of  compelling reasons why breeders should have the right to receive 
benefit  from their  work,  the  purpose  of  IP in  seeds not  always  reflected in  its  use.  Within some 
intellectual property systems, rights are no longer just protection of  invention but also a source of  
significant power.154 In the 1980s in the US concern was evinced about the concentration of  patents in 
the hands of  a small number of  biotechnology firms and the tendency towards monopoly within the 
industry.  Those  companies  that  hold  the  bulk  of  patents  are  transnational  corporations  normally 
engaged in agriculture, as well as pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Increasingly, their research is focused 
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on  the  development  of  seed-chemical  input  packages  that  tie  genetically  engineered  seeds  to 
complementary  artificial  fertilisers  and  pesticides.  These  companies  are  highly  geared  towards  the 
market of  farmers in the developed world, to markets from which they have the potential to derive 
profit.
Significant from a property perspective is the way in which private property has expanded from 
its originally limited jurisdiction to an almost inescapable facet of  the global agricultural system. IP as a 
property system has come to dominate the property landscape of  plant genetic resources and made it 
almost impossible for other systems of  management to coexist. Those who seek access to the most 
advanced varieties of  key crops have little choice but to purchase them, tying them into a relationship 
of  dependence with international agrochemical firms. The negative impact of  IPRs arises when they 
are applied in systems for which they are ill-fitted and counter to the realities of  plant management. As 
Pringle writes, “if  the keys to the creation of  new miracle plants that defy pests, or grow well despite 
droughts or floods...are locked up in the safe of  agribusiness, it is hard to see how poor nations will 
ever reap the benefits.”155 Both the profits and the agricultural benefits of  biotechnological research are 
concentrated in advanced industrialised nations, but with the proliferation of  propertised seed and the 
push for harmonisation of  IP regimes, other states are drawn into accepting private property regulation 
without reaping the benefits. 
Further,  the  private  property  system has  cemented  itself  by  creating  a  seemingly  arbitrary 
distinction between raw and elite germplasm. The private property regime protects propertised seed, 
that is,  seed that has been engineered through scientific breeding techniques, and excludes varieties 
produced through traditional breeding techniques. The unprotected varieties, however, have provided 
and continue to provide the genetic characteristics which are used to engineer propertised varieties. 
Propertised seed is a fundamentally different resource from the traditional varieties that were the basis 
of  agriculture before the turn of  the 20th century. Its spread has led to the loss of  biodiversity –  since 
1970, 96% of  corn planted in the United States is hybrid corn156 – and has demoted the seed from its 
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place at the centre of  agricultural production to the status of  simply an input.157 
There are still  a  multitude of  organisations  that  continue to operate  under  a  public  goods 
culture,  distributing  varieties  without  the  enforcement  of  patents  for  the  benefit  of  farmers  and 
scientific  advancement.  Institutions  like  the  World  Vegetable  Centre  (AVDRC),158 and  the  public 
research institutions such as the IRRI continue to supply the fruits of  their research without charge. 
Patents,  have,  however,  somewhat  paralysed  these  public  institutions.  According  to  Pringle,  the 
expanding interest of  biotech corporation in staple crops has made it difficult for these institutions to 
provide  varieties  to  disadvantaged  farmers.159 The  CGIAR  system  institutions  find  themselves 
constrained by the need to negotiate access to IPR protected germplasm in order to complete their 
research.160 IP protections create obstacles for public research institutions to both access resources and 
to distribute the fruits of  their research. 
4.4 Utility and Value in the Seed
 Russian  scientist  Nikolai  Vavilov,  through  extensive  collection  and  collation  of  botanical 
samples, managed to map out what are now called the Vavilov Centres of  Origin – as close as possible 
to determining where each of  the world's important food crops originates. Not only did he find that all 
the world's major crops originated from centres making up under a quarter of  the world's arable land,161 
he also found that these centres were mostly located in the global South. His findings provided the 
foundations for later claims of  nations of  the South that their resources have been taken for the gain 
of  others – the world's 'breadbasket' nations are almost devoid of  crops of  any dietary significance, 
while most of  the world's most important crops are derived from centres in the South.
 These findings, along with an expose of  the workings of  the seed industry were published in 
1979 by Pat Roy Mooney in his volume Seeds of  the Earth. The small volume was swiftly seized upon by 
activists for the developing world, who used it to support claims that an extremely valuable resource 
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was being removed from the periphery without compensation. The book significantly altered views 
about the way in which the value of  germplasm was designated. It illustrated the political and corporate 
forces  at  play  in  the  seed  sovereignty  debate.162 Some  authors  argue  that  Mooney  presents  an 
exaggerated and distorted  picture of  the actual value of  seed resources. Frankel challenges Mooney's 
assertion that breeders rely on a constant supply of  germplasm from the South, and accuses him of  
fostering  a  “litigious  community  insisting  of  sovereign  rights”  which  has  the  potential  to  damage 
conservation efforts.163 Activists have criticised breeders of  the North for robbing the South of  its 
genes, then selling them back in the form of  high yielding varieties.  The general sentiment is  that 
resources have been taken from developing nations under the understanding that they are common and 
costless, but later return a commodity which can be bought and sold.164 
Thus, the world's plant genetic resources raise an important question of  value – as a resource 
that it is almost impossible to put a price on. Claims for compensation for genetic resources are either 
based in retrospectivity, or on a possible future utility, both of  which are rejected by seed company 
representatives as  being baseless and impossible to quantify.165 But,  as Kloppenburg and Kleinman 
argue, just because it is difficult for plant germplasm to take on a price does not mean that it should not 
be given value.166 The utility of  seeds is not granted to it purely through its genetic manipulation.  Genes 
do not have inherent financial value, but their manipulation at certain tems and in certain ways may 
render them profitable.167 If  the scientifically bred seed is seen as a commodity, traditional breeders can 
add utility to it, but not value.
The question of  value is further complicated by the issue of  genetic erosion. Not only does the 
private property regime only value certain resources, and certain contributions to those resources, the 
spread of  these seeds has led to the disappearance of  others,  and the subsequent loss  of  genetic 
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diversity.  The  world's  landraces  are  an  important  source  of  sustenance  for  many  people,  but  the 
potential  worth  of  their  genetic  information  for  biotechnological  research  is  also  significant.  As 
Evenson, Gollin and Santaniello note, “costs of  conserving germplasm thus necessitate some implicit 
ranking of  the value of  different species.”168 
Genetic erosion has increased the 'perceived value' of  plant germplasm.  That is, those who 
hold it consider that it is now worth more to plant breeders than it once was.169 William Brown in his 
article  “Plant Genetic  Resources:  A View from the Seed Industry”,  throws doubt on the value of  
landrace genetic material. He argues that the majority of  breeding is done through the selection of  
traits from elite varieties, not landraces, and that the value of  unimproved germplasm must be weighed 
up against the preservation value of  collection. Elite lines, he states, can cost a company hundreds of  
thousands to develop, in contrast to an unquantifiable unknown potential of  landraces.170 As Fowler 
and  Falcon argue,  “[n]o  substantial  market  for  PGR has  ever  existed.  Traditional  farmer  varieties, 
though used as breeding materials, have never been sold as such. Developing countries clinging to the 
hope that they will someday get lucky and win the gene lottery are likely to be disappointed.”171 
Unlocking the secrets of  the genome has equipped plant breeders with a new set of  tools, but 
also with a new set of  responsibilities. The new technologies allow scientists to more directly target and 
enhance or reduce specific traits in species. As Farnham states of  the technology “[w]ith the advent of  
biotechnology, the entire gene pool of  living things carried potential value.”172 Scientists and corporate 
breeders are now in the position to determine which traits are valuable, and which are not. 
The  great  triumph  of  private  property  regulation  is  that  it  has  taken  a  resource  that  for 
millennia was handled effectively under one system, and subsumed it under a system of  private rights 
consolidated in a transformed system of  agricultural production. It has done so through a mechanism 
of  valuing which turns the tenets of  common property against themselves. Private property in seeds 
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relies  on  a discriminatory  mechanism of  value  which  renders  common property  resources  free  to 
appropriate yet charges for the use of  resources it creates from their genetic material. This undermines 
common property, a viable management system, and one to which seeds as a natural resource fit more 
logically. 
5. Potential Strategies for the Resolution  of  Property Issues in Seeds
The property environment in seeds is one of  conflicting views of  management. The operation 
of  seeds  as  a  common  property  resource  is  increasingly  threatened  by  the  spread  and 
internationalisation of  intellectual property protection, while intellectual property protections continue 
to consolidate the benefits of  plant breeding in a limited number of  hands. The strategies that have 
been pursued to overcome these tensions in seed ownership fall into three broad categories – those 
that seek reservations from private property protection in the form of  rights or exceptions, those that 
rely on the principle of  national sovereignty to deliver more equitable results for communities, and 
those that seek to radically transform the property environment, such as open source biotechnology. 
Each  of  these  strategies  has  its  strengths  and  weaknesses  as  an  achievable  and  equitable  way  to 
overcome the stifling effects of  private property protections and their marginalisation of  other systems 
of  management. 
5.1 Resolutions – For Whom?
Analysis  of  the  plant  genetic  resource  ownership  debate  from  a  property  perspective  is, 
theoretically, a means through which to evaluate solutions for those who have been disenfranchised by 
the spread of  private property. According to Mayozer and Roudart, the inequalities between developing 
and  developed  world  agricultural  producers  have  never  been  greater.173 Detractors  of  the  private 
property system deplore the ways in which IPRs have disenfranchised farmers and left them with no 
choice  but  to  embrace  private  property  in  seeds.  Any  analysis  of  solutions  to  the  impact  of  IP 
protections over seeds must ask who the potential beneficiaries of  any such solution should be. 
173 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart.  A History of  World Agriculture: From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis. (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2006), 441.
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The private property regime in seeds is tied to a transformed agricultural system which has 
developed to utilise propertised seeds and their complementary inputs. It is a system based on large-
scale,  intensive  farming  of  a  few  select  crops,  in  combination  with  artificial  fertilisers,  chemical 
herbicides and insecticides and mechanisation, and operates according to its own logics of  production, 
distribution and consumption. Although these changes are relatively new in the history of  agriculture, 
they have altered, perhaps irrevocably, the practice of  farming in the agriculturally dominant nations of  
the world. Returning to a system completely free of  these technologies and methods seems untenable. 
 Evident  in  the  seed war  debates  of  the  FAO is  a  clear  sense  of  the  need to compensate 
producers  who  have  lost  from  the  removal  of  germplasm  from  the  South.  Who  should  be 
compensated for this removal is often unclear. A seed's centre of  origin is not necessarily its centre of  
development. As Wilkes notes, the centre of  origin for wheat is the Near East, but its most productive 
variations were developed elsewhere.174 Frankel adds that the genes for 'dwarfing' the varieties of  wheat 
and rice that became the products of  the Green Revolution originate in Japan and Taiwan, neither of  
which is a developing country.175 Compensating custodians of  genetic resources is extremely difficult, 
especially because up until recently, genetic resources have been considered 'common heritage', and 
therefore not traceable to an indentifiable group. 
What is then an appropriate and realistic solution for the disenfranchised custodians of  the 
world's germplasm resources? Free access to propertised varieties is not necessarily the best solution 
for farmers of  the Third World. The Green Revolution showed that widespread application of  high 
yielding  varieties  can  cause  more  harm  than  good  to  local  agricultural  systems  if  applied 
indiscriminately. As Kloppenburg notes, “does the Sudan really want access to a Funk Seed Company 
sorghum line that, through recombinant DNA transfer, has had a bacterial gene added that provides 
resistance  to  a  proprietary  herbicide  produced  by  Funk's  corporate  parent,  the  transnational 
agrichemical giant Ciba-Geigy corporation?”176 Solutions must therefore be critical about what is firstly, 
174 H. Garrison Wilkes, “Plant Genetic Resources over Ten-Thousand Years” in Seeds and Sovereignty, ed. Kloppenburg, 68.
175 Otto Frankel, “Genetic Resources: Evolutionary and Social Responsibilities” in Seeds and Sovereignty, ed. Kloppenburg, 37.
176 Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 287.
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achievable, but more importantly appropriate for farmers. 
5.2 Rights Reservation Strategies
5.2.1 The Rights Reservation Approach
Rights reservation strategies are those that attempt to build rights or exemptions for farmers 
and researchers into the private property system of  ownership. They are a pragmatic solution which 
recognises  the  realities  of  private  property  regulation  without  resigning  all  control  or  reward  for 
farmers to corporate interests. Solutions of  this nature include community IPRs, farmers' privilege and 
farmers' rights. The focus of  such solutions is the need to compensate farmers and traditional breeders, 
or to devise ways in which to obviate the impacts of  privatised seed on their activities. Networks of  
farmers, supported by NGOs, contest that it is their right to have access to varieties that they have had 
a  hand  in  developing.  As  Borowiak  states,  “  if  “breeders’  rights”  was  the  pivot  upon  which 
agribusinesses lobbied for changes in commercial law, “farmers’ rights,” “indigenous rights,” and, more 
recently,  “human rights” provide  the  ground upon which resistance  to plant  variety  IPRs is  being 
waged.”177 
There is a strong undercurrent of  theft of  resources in the positions of  those who campaign 
for  compensation.  With  statements  of  writers  such  as  Mooney,  who claim that  developing  world 
germplasm is worth billions to the developed world seed industry, and the admission of  United States 
cabinet official Warren Christopher that the value of  South germplasm contribution annually to its two 
leading crops is US$10.2 billion,178 many have asked how these resources have been taken without any 
form of  compensation to the nations that hold them. This has led to allegations of  biopiracy – a term 
used to refer to the extraction of  biological materials with properties of  use commercially without 
consent or compensation of  the nation-state in which it is found. According to Ong, “[t]he biopiracy 
label is part of  the rhetoric used to communicate the injustice, or perceived inequity which emerges 
from the particular methods of  exploiting genetic resources.”179
177 Borowiak, “Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds”, 512.
178 United States Secretary of  State Warren Christopher in a letter of  August 16th, 1994  quoted in RAFI, Enclosures of  the  
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The concept of  farmers' rights was introduced in the 1980s, in response to what many saw as 
the aggressive spread of  plant breeders' rights over developed varieties. Commission on Plant Genetic 
Resources (CPGR) Resolution 5/89 defines farmers' rights as 'rights arising from the past, present and 
future contributions of  farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, 
particularly  those in the centres of  origin/diversity.”180 They are generally  regarded to be collective 
rather  than  individual  rights.181 The  1989  session  of  the  FAO saw the  official  recognition  of  the 
concept of  farmers' rights, and the commitment to establish an international fund. The fund would be 
directed at nations with strong plant breeding industries to donate for  insitu  resource conservation.182 
2001's ITPGR addressed farmers' rights, stating that rights over seeds will not “limit any rights that 
farmers may have to save, use, exchange and sell farm saved seed or propagated material”.183 However, 
the  provision  places  responsibility  for  the  implementation  of  farmers'  rights  within  national 
jurisdiction. Since, a number of  legislative measures have been taken, including India's Protection of  Plant  
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act (2001), and the African Union Model Law on Rights of  Local Communities,  
Farmers, Breeders and Access (2000), a model statute for African state domestic implementation.184  
There have been a number of  legislative initiatives aimed at using the ambiguity of  the 'sui 
generis' concept to implement systems that are in the favour of  producers. One such example is the 
Plant Variety Protection legislation in Thailand. Designed to fulfill the requirements of  27.3(b), it gives 
farmers and communities access to developed plant varieties, and forces commercial plant breeders to 
agree to commit at least 5% of  the benefits they accrue from their varieties to holders of  the original 
germplasm.185 India's plant variety protection legislation contains one of  the strongest affirmations of  
farmers'  rights  in  domestic  legislation.  It  creates  a  system of  parallel  plant  breeders'  and  farmers' 
180 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge. (London: Earthscan, 2004), 39.
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rights.186 The legislation defines an 'extant' variety as “(ii) a farmers’ variety; or (iii) a variety about which 
there is common knowledge; or (iv) any other variety which is in the public domain.”187 These varieties 
are eligible for plant variety protection under the Act. Further, a gene fund is set up to compensate 
farmers for their contribution to agriculture.188 These successes have been made in the face of  strong 
opposition; many consider the 1991 UPOV Convention to be the only effective sui generis system.189 
Farmers' privilege is another reservation, but does not take the form of  a positive right. Instead, 
it provides an exemption to plant breeders' rights which allow farmers to reuse purchased seed and to 
exchange it within informal networks of  farmers, as long as it generates no commercial gain. A feature 
of  the 1978 UPOV Convention, the 1991 version saw the provision significantly curtailed, and any 
attempt to use such a privilege to enhance the position of  farmers now seems a remote possibility. 
Community  IPRs are  another  solution devised to overcome problems of  access  caused by 
private  IPRs.  According  to  Stenson  and  Gray,  the  concept  of  communitarian  IPRs  is  based  on 
recognising community sovereignty over resources, as distinct from ownership. There have been some 
instances in which indigenous communities have had rights in the form of  IPRs granted, but only in an 
implicit  way.190 That  is,  their  ownership  has  been  recognised in  less  formalised  arrangements  than 
private  IPRs.  A  system  of  community  IPRs  has  been  considered  in  Brazil,  in  India  and  in  the 
Philippines, but without power and effective mechanisms to enforce them, community IPRs remain an 
incomplete solution.191
 5.2.2 Evaluating Farmers' Rights as a Strategy for Resolving Property Problems
From a property perspective, there are a number of  difficulties with rights reservation strategies. 
It is difficult to ground claims for compensation in any claim other than moral entitlement theory of  
property.192 Moral entitlement theory is a theory whereby property is granted according to moral right 
186 Susette  Biber-Klemm and  Thomas  Cottier.  Rights  to  Plant  Genetic  Resources  and  Traditional  Knowledge:  Basic  Issues  and  
Perspectives. (Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2005), 90. 
187 Protection of  Plant Varieties and Farmer's Rights Act, (2001) India Article 2(J).  http://www.grain.org/brl_files/india-pvp-
2001-en.pdf
188  C.S. Srinivasan, “Exploring the Feasibility of  Farmers' Rights”, Development Policy Review 21, no.4 (2003): 442. 
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to  an  object  due  to  a  connection  between  object  and  property.193  In  this  sense,  they  rely  on 
anachronistic  claims  to  own  resources,  and  are  based  on  moral  entitlement  to  receive  some 
compensation for loss. 
Stenson and Gray are critical of  claims based in moral entitlement, and on claims based on 
rights in general. “If  Third World campaigners wish to argue for intellectual property rights for cultural 
communities,” they argue, “they should abandon the idea that these communities are entitled by right to 
intellectual property over genetic resources, and instead concentrate on consequentialist arguments”, 
which they ground in autonomy.194 Through the pursuit of  rights reservation strategies, patents have 
been  overturned,  farmers  have  won  small  concessions  over  their  freedom  to  use  stored  seed, 
agreements  have  been  made  to  funnel  compensation  to  owners  of  genetic  resources,  but  these 
represent minor incursions into the rapidly expanding private property system. Further, farmers' rights 
value resources only in terms of  their contribution to industrial agriculture, and assume that monetary 
compensation is the principal goal.195 Modelling the entitlement of  traditional farmers to their own 
crops  upon the  same form as  propertarian IPRs is  a  major  concession to the dominant  form of  
resource organisation which does little to obviate the dependence of  farmers upon the private property 
regime. 
The  major  problem  with  rights  reservation  strategies  is  implementation  rather  than 
conceptualisation. Brush states that the recognition of  the work of  farmers through farmers' rights is 
“moral, but largely rhetorical.”196 This is because the concept has, since its inception, struggled with 
problems  of  implementation  and  translation  into  domestic  law.  Such  solutions  require  financial 
concessions, which often, both governments and private sector organisations are not prepared to make. 
The proposed FAO fund for insitu resource capacity building has been established, but donations have 
been negligible, and nothing in law compels countries to donate. Community IPRs have also suffered 
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from a lack of  practical support.197  
Another concern is the ability  to find a way around farmers'  rights.  Srinivasan believes, for 
example,  that  the  Indian  Plant  Variety  Protection  laws  create  an  adversarial  environment  between 
breeders and farmers rather than fostering openness and sharing upon which access depends. Instead 
of  paying the required amount to farmers for their contributions, he attests, breeders will steer clear of  
PBRs  which  are  linked  to  farmers'  rights,  and  tend  towards  patents  or  technological  solutions.198 
Farmers'  rights  as  a  solution require  enforcement,  as  their  recognition puts  financial  strain  on the 
breeding industry nationally and internationally. 
On the other hand, Borowiak is positive about the impact of  farmers' rights. He argues that as 
farmers' rights offer a “unique form of  resistance” against plant breeders' rights, by creating a new 
form of  right rather than simply trying to negate the operation of  plant breeders'  rights.199 These 
strategies can see benefits flowing directly to farmers, both in terms of  rights and remuneration. They 
can be a way to recognise the contribution of  the community of  farmers to the varieties they have 
helped to develop without attributing to them ownership.200 In this sense, rights reservation strategies 
are mild, concessional strategies that do not overturn the existing environment of  intellectual property 
protection, but seek ways to recognise traditional contributions within that system.  
Rights reservation strategies may create actual, material results for communities of  farmers and 
their varieties. As a property solution, however, they are based only in a justification of  being morally 
entitled to gains from crop germplasm development, and thus will always rely on the cooperation of  
national and plant breeding industry agents to ensure their protection. They seek compensation and 
privileges for traditional breeders but do not attempt to challenge in any way the property system that 
has replaced the commons.  It  seems unlikely that  they alone will  be able to redress  imbalances in 
ownership created by private property controls. 
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5.3 National Sovereignty under the Convention on Biological Diversity
5.3.1 The National Sovereignty Approach
National sovereignty is an increasingly prevalent principle of  resource control which has come 
to override the concept of  common heritage in plant genetic resource management. Recently affirmed 
in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the national sovereignty principle places the 
control of  plant genetic resources in the hands of  nation states, and rather than seeing the resource as 
common, recognises that it is possible to trace certain plant genetic resources to specific indigenous 
communities.201  The CBD was adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992, creating financial incentives for 
developing nations to conserve their biodiversity. According to Abbott there are two grounds for the 
affirmation of  national sovereignty over plant genetic resources - “to provide an economic incentive to 
countries for preserving genetic resources by assuring compensation for their use, and secondly, to 
enhance economic welfare in countries that house existing stocks of  genetic resources by assuring 
compensation for genetic assets.202
The CBD is just the most recent development in a long history of  state involvement in plant 
genetic resources. In fact, state intervention in the development of  seeds can be traced back to the 
Columbian Exchange.203 Since the advent of  scientific plant breeding, the state has been a vital part of  
distributing and developing the seed. According to Murphy, without the public sector push for the 
development of  new plant breeding technologies and methods, the trebling of  food production that 
has occurred in the past 50 years would not have been possible.204 The public sector, he argues, as a 
creator and disseminator of  research on the seed has been instrumental to agricultural improvement.205 
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Indeed, before the 20th century the state was the principle vehicle of  seed research. Evenson reports 
that at the beginning of  the 20th  Century research expenditure in the United States was two-thirds 
public and at the end, only one-third public.206 This massive shift in expenditure has had significant 
consequences for the agriculture industry, and for the production of  food in general. In developed 
agricultural  nations  of  the  North,  the  importance  of  the  state  as  a  broker  of  research  has  been 
significantly diminished. 
In a number of  developing nations, the relationship between the state and the seed began in the 
FAO “seed wars”, when plant germplasm was recognised as a valuable and increasingly scarce resource. 
In an attempt to safeguard against so-called biopiracy, many nations have become increasingly defensive 
of  their plant genetic resources. The concern about the acquisition and privatisation of  these resources 
has  caused  germplasm rich  nations  to  erect  barriers  around  their  resources,  an  action  which  has 
implications for both private and common property management.  As Fowler and Falcon write, “they 
[governments] are thus closing the commons themselves by enacting restrictive legislation governing 
access to genetic resources and by restricting the scope of  international agreements aimed at facilitating 
access  to  those  resources”.207 They  add  that  “governments  seem  ill  prepared  to  adjust  to  the 
transformation they are creating.”208
As actors in the seed sovereignty debate, states have, with varying degrees of  success, played a 
role as intermediary between private industry and farmer interests. The CBD affirmed the sovereignty 
of  nations over their germplasm resources, in a hope that more equitable bilateral agreements between 
state and private industry would be created as a result. Imbuing nations with sovereignty over their 
resources was to give them a broker-like position, from which they could better defend the entitlements 
of  traditional farmers while still receiving a share of  the commercial rewards from plant breeding. 
The most commonly touted success story of  this type of  arrangement is the contract between 
American pharmaceutical firm Merck and INBio, a government affiliated biodiversity organisation in 
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Costa Rica. Under the deal, INBio provides Merck with 10 000 samples of  soil, plants and animals it 
needs for its pharmaceutical research, and Merck compensates INBio with $1.1 million US, as well as a 
portion of  licence fees from its patents. 10 percent of  INBio's budget goes to the Costa Rican National 
Park  Fund.209 The  agreement  has  provided  a  model  for  a  partnership  between  private  sector 
organisations and states to create equitable transfers of  resources.210
As a principle organising the management of  plant genetic  resources,  state sovereignty is  a 
complicated concept. Sovereignty confers the right to legitimately command authority over a given 
jurisdiction.211   It is not synonymous with ownership, and sovereignty in terms of  the CBD has an 
element of  custodianship. States may exercise a sovereign right over their  natural  resources,  but in 
doing so are expected to safeguard and protect those resources.212 According to Bromley, this suggests 
that “'ownership' resides with the citizenry at large, management and control resides with a class of  
bureaucrats, while use resides with a subset of  the citizenry.”213 The affirmation of  state sovereignty 
does not render plant genetic resources a part of  a state property regime, but instead places the state 
firmly between common and private ownership, giving it the task of  negotiating between them. 
5.3.2 Evaluating National Sovereignty as a Strategy for Resolving Property Problems
 Since the 1980s, the environment in plant genetic resource management has been permeated by 
a  sense  of  injustice  from  many  gene-rich  developing  nations.  The  CBD  is  important  in  that  it 
recognises firstly that these gene resources have value, and secondly that their ownership can be traced 
to specific communities. National sovereignty is said to herald the possibility of  equitable solutions for 
traditional  communities  of  farmers  in  future  negotiations  over  plant  genetic  resources.  Unlike  the 
concept of  farmers' rights, which according to Kloppenburg and Kleinman has “potentially narrow 
connotations”,214 the  national  sovereignty  principle offers  a  comprehensive solution for negotiating 
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access and compensation for traditional farmers. 
 Considerable expectations are placed on public sector research to fill the gaps that are left by 
private research. Public sector breeding is expected to develop the crops that are not of  high research 
priority to corporate breeders, and to “optimize public benefits” from advancements in agriculture.215 It 
is  hoped  that  with  support  from the  private  sector  through  arrangements  under  the  CBD,  these 
expectations will be more effectively met. 
Ensuring that the state sovereignty principle is used effectively is essential to its ability to solve 
the property problems created by IPRs. In some circumstances it can actually work to the detriment of  
commons management. As Falcon and Fowler write that  “in an attempt to prevent the closing of  the 
commons by patents  and in a simultaneous attempt to exploit  market  opportunities of  their  own, 
countries are now restricting access to once public materials.”216 In these circumstances the desire to 
affirm state sovereignty overrides the intended outcome, to use national sovereignty as a means to 
negotiate more equitable results for traditional communities. The principle of  state sovereignty does 
not  outright  benefit  traditional  farmers  outright,  it  must  be  used  in  specific  ways  to  ensure  that 
community interests are served.
The major concern with the principle of  national sovereignty and its ability to achieve results 
for traditional farmers is ensuring that the link between government and traditional communities is 
firmly established. The CBD, recognising this challenge, requires that prior informed consent of  the 
use of  a bioresource come not just from the state in question but also the local community involved. 
The Merck/INBio agreement is heralded as the model example of  the type of  arrangement that can be 
made through the provisions of  the CBD. However, it may not be applicable or even possible in all 
situations. Not all countries may be fortunate enough to attract an interested commercial partner, and 
according to Falcon and Fowler, “it is difficult to see how peasants and indigenous peoples can provide 
informed consent to bioprospecting activities and construct exchange agreements adequately sensitive 
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to their own interests.”217
Further,  the  contractual  relationships  that  are  created  through  the  use  of  the  national 
sovereignty may exclude a range of  potential beneficiaries from attaining commercial benefit. As Brush 
notes,  “If  knowledge and genetic  resources collected under  contract  lead to a  patentable  product, 
communities that are not part of  the contract but have the same resources can be deprived of  the 
opportunity  to  commercialize  their  knowledge”.218 McAfee  criticises  the  INBio  organisation  for 
claiming to represent the national interest yet not clearly defining how and to whom the commercial 
benefits will be spread.219 Brush argues that the CBD is a final act of  commons enclosure, one that has 
shifted the debate from an abstract international level firmly into the realm of  domestic legislation, 
forcing national legislatures to make provisions for biocontracting.220
The principle of  national sovereignty can only form an adequate solution if  it is treated not as 
an ends in itself  but as a means to negotiate more equitable, contractual relationships over resources. It 
can, at best, elevate the bargaining position of  those countries with germplasm resources, redistributing 
some of  the gains from the current proprietary system into the hands of  germplasm-rich states. In 
principle, it radically restructures the property environment, but the potential for the misuse of  the 
intermediary position of  nation-states is high. National sovereignty under the CBD can have potentially 
positive impacts for traditional communities, but only if  it is correctly managed. 
5.4 Proprietary Resolutions: Open Source Biotechnology
5.4.1 The Open Source Biotechnology Approach
 Open source as a resource organisation paradigm has risen to popularity through its application 
to the software industry and the development of  open source software. Since the 1990s a number of  
computer software programs have been developed which operate under general public licence – they 
can be copied and distributed, used and improved, without any of  these actions conferring rights in 
property. Neither the underlying program nor the modifications made by any user can be the subject of  
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intellectual property rights. Those who add to these programs get no incentive in right, but do have the 
incentive of  being able to access the technology free of  charge.221 
 As Boyle explains, “[t]he importance of  open-source software is not that it introduces us to a 
wholly new idea; it is that it makes us clearly see a very old idea.”222 It draws its logics of  operation from 
much older  philosophies  of  resource  management,  and is  closely  linked  to  the  idea  of  commons 
management. Open access principles create, according to Kloppenburg, a kind of  limited commons, in 
which only those who consent to share are included..223 Recently, attempts have been made to extend 
the same model of  development and distribution to biotechnology. This recognises the fact that seeds, 
like software, are produced at a high cost to the developer, but can be copied and distributed amongst 
consumers much more cheaply and easily. 
 Applied  to  biotechnology,  open  source  practices  could  create  a  “protected  commons”  for 
biological research,224 in which licences to technologies within the system are free.  Participatory plant 
breeding,  as defined by Hope,  is  based on facilitating more equitable access to technology for the 
benefit of  those marginalised by current modes of  research.225 Varieties and technologies would be 
available  under  licences  that  confer  access,  and  any  improvements  made  on  varieties  under  these 
licences would also be exempt from private property protection. The strength of  such a model is that it 
recognises that farmers are both consumers and developers of  seed.226 The proposed model would 
transform the environment in plant breeding, encompassing plant varieties, methods of  plant breeding 
and complementary technologies. 
Organisations currently operating to promote open source biotechnology include MASIPAG in 
the Philippines – a group of  scientists and farmers who collect, develop and distribute rice varieties. 
MASIPAG trains farmers in the basic methods of  hybridisation and selection and collects landraces 
221 James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of  the Mind. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 
192.
222 Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement”, 48.
223 Kloppenburg, “Seeds, Sovereignty, and the Vía Campesina”, 11.
224 Heike Baumüller and Geoff  Tansey, “Responding to Change” in The Future Control of  Food, ed. Tansey and Rajotte, 193. 
225 Janet Elizabeth Hope, Open Source Biotechnology (doctoral thesis). 
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and hybrid varieties alike.227 CAMBIA, a research institute based in Australia, promotes the BiOS – 
Biotechnology Open Source – initiative, extending a type of  licence which, while distributed free of  
charge, asks for contributions from those who derive profit from open access technologies.228  
The open source software movement and those who campaign for farmers' rights have similar 
aims of  attempting to achieve access to a resource whose development works most effectively when an 
open environment of  innovation is permitted.229 Open source biotechnology is  a practice with the 
possibility to return control of  resources to farmers, while also radically changing research priorities. 
Beyond this, open source biotechnology represents an attempt to redress the failings of  public sector 
research over the second half  of  the 20th century and to direct it away from purely serving the aims of  
the private sector..230 
5.4.2  Evaluating Open Source  Biotechnology as  a  Potential  Resolution for  Property 
Problems
From a property perspective, open source in biotechnology is a unique suggestion because it 
translates  the  way  that  seeds  have  been  held  for  centuries  into  a  new model  which  also  reflects 
conservation and technological access problems. As a type of  resource management, open access is a 
system in which no ownership exists (res nullius).  Under open access regimes, there is no mechanism to 
exclude users, which can foster the tendency to overuse and exploitation by individual users. This is 
similar to the situation described in Hardin's “Tragedy of  the Commons”. The successes of  the open 
source software movement, however, challenge the proposition that innovation will only be effective 
under a system which confers individual rights of  ownership. 
There are a number of  authors who are critical of  open access as a management system. It can 
be seen as the result of  a breakdown in commons management or as an anarchical absence of  property 
management. According to Bromley, “Open access results from the absence - or the breakdown - of  an 
authority system whose very purpose was to assure compliance with a set of  behavioral conditions with 
227 Boru Douthwaite, “Enabling Innovation: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Fostering Technological Change” 
quoted in Aoki, Seed Wars, 115.
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respect  to  the  natural  resource.”231  Bromley  argues  that  in  many  cases  of  resource  management, 
commons management  has  “deteriorated”  into  a  scheme of  open access.  The inability  to  achieve 
effective group management of  a resource and to exclude those outside the demarcated commons 
group causes the common management system to break down.232
Open access  can  prove  a  way  to  reinvent  the  commons  philosophy,  without  relying  on  a 
management system that  has  proven itself  unable  to effectively  resist  private  property  controls.  It 
operates under the same logics of  openness and absence of  private rights, while adapting to the realities 
of  a system currently dominated by private IPRs. Open source biotechnology could create a new form 
of  organised  resistance  behind  which  farmers'  rights  advocates  and  preservationists  alike  could 
mobilise.233 It does not only attempt to circumvent ownership issues but also recognises that private 
plant breeding industries are targeted primarily towards certain, potentially lucrative crops. Crops like 
cassava and beans are lower priority for private breeders, but feed many of  the world's poor.234 It would 
also give smaller companies a greater chance to compete with larger companies by reducing the barriers 
to industry entry and the costs of  variety development.235 
One of  the main issues in applying open source principles to seeds is whether the model is 
actually appropriate for biotechnology research. Though the resources in question, software and seeds, 
are similar, the industries built around them function differently. According to Carol Kovacs of  IBM, in 
the software industry, most of  the major competitors are already cross-licensed, which is not the case in 
the plant breeding industry.236 She warns against the application of  a model to this different sort of  
industry, in which innovation and reward are more closely linked. Aoki notes that genetic information is 
far less codified than software and far more dynamic.237 
 Open  source  biotechnology's  major  obstacle  as  a  transformative  property  model  is 
231 Daniel Bromley, “The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy”, 13.
232 Daniel Bromley, “The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy”, 14.
233 Aoki, Seed Wars, 115.
234 Eran Binenbaum  et.al,  “South-North Trade,  Intellectual  Property Jurisdictions,  and  Freedom to Operate  in Agricultural 
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actualisation. Though there are many proponents of  the open source biotechnology system, it runs 
counter to the developments in the seed industry over the past century, and thus for it to have any 
considerable impact, it  requires a significant revision of  the relationships of  actors within the seed 
industry. For example, technologies distributed by CAMBIA are unable to be mixed with proprietary 
technologies,  creating  reluctance  from breeders  to use  them.238 The question of  how this  type  of  
management would be compatible with other international regulations such as the CBD and TRIPS has 
not been firmly elucidated.
As a property solution, the open source model is the one that best engages with the untenability 
of  the commons/ private property impasse, and creates a solution whereby research is accessible, and 
the potential for resource theft or an anticommons research situation is obviated. The success of  open 
source biotechnology as a solution for farmers relies on its execution, and the creation of  infrastructure 
that could support it internationally, and clarify its relation to other schemas of  ownership. As the most 
theoretically desirable way to transform the ownership environment in seeds, it is also the most difficult 
to achieve. 
6. Conclusion
Over the course of  the 20th century the property environment in plant genetic resources has 
been radically transformed. New ways of  owning these resources, in the form of  intellectual property 
protections  including  patents  and  plant  breeders'  rights,  have  replaced  millenia-old  systems  of  
management  in  common.  They  have  relied  on  technological  developments  which  place  a  barrier 
between farmers and their inputs, and an imbalance of  power which has allowed a small number of  
countries to dictate the shape of  a global intellectual property regime. Intellectual property, as a form 
of  private  property,  is  based  on  the  establishment  of  novelty  and  an  inventive  step,  and  traces 
ownership back to a single inventor. All of  these principles are difficult to apply to the development of  
seeds. The spread of  private property controls over seeds was not an inevitable development, but one 
238 Kloppenburg, “Seeds, Sovereignty, and the Vía Campesina”, 14.
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that served the interests of  a small class of  dominant corporate actors in the United States at the turn 
of  the century. An examination of  the theory behind the two forms of  property that have characterised 
the 20th century ownership environment in seeds reveals that private property has only cemented itself  
through subverting the tenets of  common property regulation and perpetuating an image of  scarcity in 
a renewable, replicable resource. In reality, commons management has existed as an effective means of  
managing plant resources for millennia. In the second half  of  the 20th century, with the increasing 
standardisation of  IP regimes worldwide, the ability of  the commons to function as a management 
system has been further jeopardised. Campaigning for the recognition of  farmers' rights, deference to 
the principle of  national sovereignty and the possibility of  an open source property system overhaul are 
three solutions that are posed to overcome the impasse between common and private property in seeds. 
Only  open source biotechnology provides a  solution that,  while  based on the same philosophy as 
common ownership, is inventive enough to redress the inequalities that private property has created.  
65
Bibliography
Abbott,  Frederick M., “Patents,  Biotechnology and Human Rights:  The Preservation of  Biodiverse 
Resources for Future Generations.” In Biotechnologies and International Human Rights, edited by Francesco 
Francioni, 315-331. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007. 
Andersen, Regine. “A History of  Farmers' Rights”. Fridtjof  Nansen Institute Paper 8, (2005). Available at: 
<http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0805.pdf.> [Accessed 27 August 2009]. 
Aoki, Keith. Seed Wars: Controversies and Cases on Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property. Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2008. 
Benda-Beckmann, Franz von, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie Wiber.  Changing Properties of  
Property. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007. 
Biber-Klemm, Susette and Thomas Cottier. Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Basic  
Issues and Perspectives. Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2005. 
Binenbaum, Eran, Carol Nottenburg, Philip G. Pardey, Brian D. Wright and Patricia Zambrano, “South-
North Trade, Intellectual Property Jurisdictions and Freedom to Operate in Agricultural Research in Staple 
Crops”,  University  of  California  Berkeley Environment  and  Production  Technology  Division  Discussion  Paper  
(2000). 
Blakeney,  Michael.  “Agricultural  Research:  Intellectual  Property  and the CGIAR System”, in  Global  
Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, edited by P. Drahos and R. Mayne, 108-123. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Bonanno, Alessandro, Lawrence Busch, William Friedland, Lourdes Gouveia, and Enzo Mingione, eds. 
From Columbus to ConAgra: The Globalisation of  Agriculture and Food. Kansas: University of  Kansas Press, 
1994. 
Borowiak, Craig. “Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds.” Politics  
and Society 32, (2004): 511-543.
Boyle,  James.  The  Public  Domain:  Enclosing  the  Commons  of  the  Mind.  New Haven and London:  Yale 
University Press, 2008.
Boyle, James. “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of  the Public Domain.”  Law 
and Contemporary Problems 66, no.3 (Winter/Spring 2003): 33-74. 
Brac de Perriere, Robert Ali and Frank Seuret.  Brave New Seeds:  The Threat of  GM Crops to Farmers.  
London: Zed Books, 2000.
Bradnee Chambers, W. Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of  Multilateral Environmental Agreements. New York 
and Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008. 
Brockway,  Lucile  H.  Science  and Colonial  Expansion:  The  Role  of  the  British  Royal  Botanic  Gardens.  New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002. 
Bromley, Daniel. “The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy.”  Environmental and 
Resource Economics no.2, (1992): 1-17.
66
Brush, Stephen. “Bioprospecting the Public Domain.” Cultural Anthropology 14, No. 4 (November 1999): 
535-555. 
Brush, Stephen. “The Demise of  'Common Heritage' and Protection for Traditional Agricultural 
Knowledge”, in Conference on Biodiversity, Biotechnology and the Protection of  Traditional Knowledge. St Louis:
Washington University, April 4-6 2003.  Available at: 
<http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Papers/Biodiversity/PDFWrdDoc/StLouis1.pd  f > [Accessed 27 
August 2009]. 
Brush,  Stephen.  Farmers'  Bounty:  Locating  Crop  Diversity  in  the  Contemporary  World.  New  Haven  and 
London: Yale University Press, 2004. 
Buanec, Bernard Le and Patrick Heffer. “The Role of  International Seed Associations in International 
Policy Development.” Journal of  New Seeds 4, no.1 (2002): 77 – 87.
Castree, Noel. “Bioprospecting: From Theory to Practice (And Back Again).” Transactions of  the Institute  
of  British Geographers 28, no. 1 (March 2003): 35-55.
Cleveland, David A., and Stephen C. Murray. “The World's Crop Genetic Resources and the Rights of  
Indigenous Farmers.” Current Anthropology 38, no. 4 (Aug-Oct. 1997): 477-515. 
Demsetz, Harold. “Toward a Theory of  Property Rights”. The American Economic Review 57, no. 2, (May 
1967): 347-359.
Doyle, Jack. Altered Harvest: Agriculture, Genetics, and the Fate of  the World's Food Supply. New York: Viking, 
1985.
Drahos, Peter. “The Right to Food, Health and Intellectual Property in the Era of  Biogopolies” in 
Commercial Law and Human Rights, edited by Stephen Bottomley and David Kinley, 215-234. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishers, 2002. 
Dutfield, Graham.  Intellectual  Property,  Biogenetic  Resources  and Traditional Knowledge.  London: Earthscan, 
2004.
Dutfield,  Graham.  Intellectual  Property  Rights  and the  Life  Science  Industries:  A Twentieth  Century  History.  
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2003. 
Evenson, R.E., D. Gollin, V. Santaniello, eds.  Agricultural Values of  Plant Genetic Resources.  Wallingford: 
CABI Publishing, 1998. 
Falcon, W. and Cary Fowler. “Carving up the Commons – Emergence of  a New International Regime 
for Germplasm Development and Transfer.” Food Policy 27, (2002): 197-222. 
Farnham,  Timothy.  Saving  Nature's  Legacy:  Origins  of  the  Idea  of  Biological  Diversity.  New Haven  and 
London: Yale University Press, 2007. 
Fedoroff, Nina Vsevolod and Nancy Marie Brown. Mendel in the Kitchen: A Scientist's View of  Genetically 
Modified Foods. Joseph Henry Press, 2004. 
Footer, Mary. “A Tale of  Two Commons: Plant Genetic Resources and Agricultural Trade Reform” in 
67
The  Regulatory  Challenge  of  Biotechnology:  Human  Genetics,  Food  an  Patents  edited  by  Hans  Somsen.  
Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 2007.
Gepts, Paul. “Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?” Plant Physiology  
134 (April 2004): 1295–1307.
Goldman,  Michael.  Privatizing  Nature:  Political  Struggles  for  the  Global  Commons.  New Jersey  and New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998. 
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of  the Commons." Science 162, (1968): 1243-1248.
Hashmi,  Sohail  (ed).  State  Sovereignty:  Change  and  Persistence  in  International  Relations.  Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
Helfer, Lawrence.  Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: The Legal Regulations and Policy Options for  
National Governments. FAO Legislative Study, 85/204.
Heller,  Michael.  “The  Tragedy  of  the  Anticommons:  Property  in  the  Transition  from  Marx  to 
Markets.” Harvard Law Review 111, (1998): 621-688.    
Herrera, Stephan. “Jefferson: Biography.” Nature Biotechnology 23, no. 6, June 2005.
Hope, Janet Elizabeth. Open Source Biotechnology. Doctoral Thesis for the Australian National University.
http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~janeth/OpenSourceBiotechnology27July2005.pdf. [Accessed 27 August 2009].
Juma, Calestous. The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds. London: Zed Books, 1989. 
Kloppenburg,  Jack.  First  the  Seed:  The  Political  Economy  of  Plant  Biotechnology  1492-2000. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Kloppenburg, Jack. R, ed.  Seeds and Sovereignty: The Use and Control of  Plant Genetic Resources.  Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1988. 
Kloppenburg, Jack, and Daniel Kleinman. "Seeds of  Struggle:  Genetic Resources and Geopolitics." 
Technology Review 90, (February/March 1987), 47-53.
Kloppenburg, Jack. “Seeds, Sovereignty, and the Vía Campesina: Plants, Property, and the Promise of  
Open Source Biology”. November 2008. 
http://www.drs.wisc.edu/kloppenburg/_publications/2008%20Seeds%20and%20Sovereignty.pdf
Keohane, Robert O. and Elinor Ostrom, eds.  Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and  
Cooperation in Two Domains. London: Sage Publications, 1995.  
Lappe, Marc. and Britt Bailey. Against the Grain: The Genetic Transformation of  Global Agriculture. London: 
Earthscan, 1999.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of  Government [1689]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Maskus, Keith, ed. Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade (Frontiers of  Economics and Globalization) volume 2. 
Oxford: Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 2008. 
68
Maskus, Keith, and Jerome Reichman, eds.  International Public  Goods and Transfer of  Technology under a  
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
May, Christopher. A Global Political Economy of  Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures? London and 
New York: Routledge, 2009.
Mazoyer,  Marcel  and Laurence Roudart.  A History  of  World  Agriculture:  From the  Neolithic  Age  to  the  
Current Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006. 
McManis, Charles R, ed. Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge. 
London: Earthscan, 2007. 
Mies, Maria and Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism: Reconnecting a Divided World. London: Zed Books, 1993. 
Mooney, Pat Roy. “The Law of  the Seed.” Development Dialogue 1-2, (1983).
Mooney, Pat Roy. Seeds of  the Earth – A Public or Private Resource? Ottawa, Canada: Inter Pares, 1979.
Murphy, Denis J.  People, Plants and Genes: The Story of  Crops and Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007.  
Murray, David. Seeds of  Concern: The Genetic Manipulation of  Plants. Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2003. 
Ong,  Burton.  Intellectual  Property  and  Biological  Resources:  Perspectives  on  Contemporary  Issues.  Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004. 
Ostrom, Elinor. "Private and Common Property Rights" in  Encyclopedia of  Law and Economics, Vol. II:  
Civil Law and Economics. Ghent, Belgium: University of  Ghent, 2000. 
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Pardey,  Philip,  ed.  The  Future  of  Food:  Biotechnology  Markets  and  Policies  in  an  International  Setting.  
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001. 
Pearse,  Andrew.  Seeds  of  Plenty,  Seeds  of  Want:  Social  and  Economic  Implications  of  the  Green  Revolution. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Pence, Gregory. The Ethics of  Food. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 
Pistorius,  Robin.  Scientists,  Plants  and Politics:  A History  of  the  Plant  Genetic  Resources  Movement.  Rome: 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, 1997.
Pringle, Peter.  Food, Inc: Mendel to Monsanto – The Promises and Perils of  the Biotech Harvest. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2003. 
Raustiala, Kal and David G. Victor. “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources.” International  
Organization 58, (Spring 2004): 277–309.
Rose,  Carol.  “Possession as the Origin of  Property” in  Property  and Persuasion:  Essays on the History,  
Theory, and Rhetoric of  Ownership. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
69
Rose, Carol. “The Comedy of  the Commons: Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public Property”, 
University of  Chicago Law Review 53, 711 (1986). 
Scrinis, Gyorgy. Colonizing the Seed: Genetic Engineering and Techno-Industrial Agriculture. Melbourne: Friends 
of  the Earth, 1995. 
Shiva, Vandana. Monocultures of  the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology. London: Zed Books, 
1993.
Shiva, Vandana.  The Violence of  the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. London: 
Zed Books, 2000. 
Shiva, Vandana, Patrick Anderson, Heffa Schuecking, Andrew Gray, Larry Lohmann, David Cooper. 
Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Pespectives. London, Zed Books, 1991. 
Srinivasan, C.S. “Exploring the Feasibility of  Farmers' Rights.” Development Policy Review 21, no. 4 (2003): 
419-447.
Stenson, Anthony and Tim Gray. “Cultural Communities and Intellectual Property in Plant Genetic 
Resources” in Justice, Property and the Environment – Social and Legal Perspectives edited by  Tim Hayward and 
John O'Neill. Aldershot/Vermont: Ashgate, 1997.
Stenson, Anthony and Tim S. Gray. The Politics of  Genetic Resource Control. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999. 
Tansey, Geoff  and Tamsin Rajotte, eds. The Future Control of  Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and  
Rules of  Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security. London: Earthscan, 2008. 
Thompson, Carol. “International Law of  the Sea/Seed: Public Domain versus Private Commodity.” 
Natural Resource Journal 44, 2004: 841-866.
Wiber, Melanie.  The Voracious Appetites of  Public versus Private Property: A View of  Intellectual Property and  
Biodiversity from Legal Pluralism. CAPRI Working Paper 40, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
The Ecologist. Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons. London: Earthscan, 1993. 
                                                                            
The Rural  Advancement Foundation International  (RAFI). Enclosures  of  the  Mind:  A Resource  Kit  on 
Community Knowledge, Biodiversity and Intellectual Property. Ottawa: RAFI, 1997.  
70
Legislation and Cases
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR), Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
(1983). [Internet] Available at:
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu/iutextE.pdf> [Accessed 27 August 2009].
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), United Nations (1992). [Internet] Available at: 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf.> [Accessed 27 August 2009].
Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  World  Trade  Organisation  (1994). 
[Internet] Available at:
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm> [Accessed 27 August 2009].
International  Treaty  of  Plant  Genetic  Resources  for  Food  and  Agriculture  (ITPGR),  Food  and 
Agriculture Organisation, (2001). [Internet] Available at:
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf> [Accessed 27 August 2009].
GRAIN. Archive of  Biodiversity Rights Legislation. [Internet] Available at: 
<http://www.grain.org/brl/> [Accessed 27 August 2009].       
Diamond v Chakrabarty  447 U.S. 303 (1980).
71
LINDSAY ASH
 Address: Neulerchenfelderstr. 2/17
Vienna 1160
AUSTRIA
Date of  Birth: 01/02/1985
Email: ashlindsay@hotmail.com
EDUCATION HISTORY – TERTIARY
Institution: University of  Vienna, Austria/ University of  Leipzig, Germany
Duration: 2007-2009
Degree: Master of  Arts in Global Studies
Major areas of  study: Global History, European Politics, International Law, Area Studies, Political and 
Economic Theory, Study of  International Institutions.
Institution: Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Degree: Bachelor of  Laws
Duration: 2004 – 2006 (placed on hold while studying Masters Degree, to be resumed on a part-time 
basis from 2010)
Current GPA: 3.786
Major Areas of  Study: Constitutional, Criminal and Property Law
Institution: Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Degree: Bachelor of  Arts
Duration: 2004 - 2006
GPA: 3.620 
Major Areas of  Study: World History, Modern History, German, International Politics.
EDUCATION HISTORY – SECONDARY
Institution: Trinity Senior High School, Wagga Wagga
Certificate: Higher School Certificate, 2002
Results (University Admissions Index): 98.65
Awards Received:  Class  of  2002 Dux (best  overall  performance),  “Class  of  1981 Most Consistent 
Student” Award, Apex Award for Community Involvement, Academic Achievement Awards (awarded 
to the student with the highest  marks) in Advanced English,  Ancient History,  Economics,  English 
Extension 1, Legal Studies and Studies of  Religion.
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
November 2005 - July 2007: Senior Customer Service Representative, Video Ezy Gladesville, Sydney.
October 2005 – July 2006: Administrative Assistant and Project Support Manager (voluntary), Oxfam 
International, Sydney.
August 2004 - October 2005: Education/ Tutoring Services, Acclaim Education.
December 2002 - July 2003: Administrative Assistant, Peter Street Dental Practice
72
LANGUAGES
Geman Proficiency: Intermediate-Advanced
Courses  Taken:  Level  B1.1  at  Goethe Institut  in  Berlin,  Germany,  Advanced level  German at  the 
University of  Vienna.
COMMUNITY SERVICE
2001 – Present – Member of  Amnesty International 
2005 – 2006 Administrative Assistant and Project Support Manager for Oxfam International Sydney 
Office, one day per week on a voluntary basis. 
2004 – 2005 – Group Coordinator, Clean Up Australia Day
Student Activities and Leadership: 
2009 – Participant, European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, Germany 
2008 – Participant, International Congress on Global and World History, Dresden, Germany
2008–Participant, Utrecht Network Summer School: Minorities and Democratic Participation, Queen’s 
University Belfast, Northern Ireland
2003-2007 – Member of  Macquarie University Law Society.
2007 - Content Manager and contributing writer for student legal publication The Brief. 
2005 - Organiser of  Macquarie University Oxfam Fair Trade Coffee Stall
2005 – Leader of  the Environmental Committee, Dunmore Lang College
2002 –Vice Captain, Trinity Senior High School, 
2000-2002 Member of  Student Council, Mt Erin High School
73
